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Abstract
In this Article, I will trace Suárez’s thoughts on the natural equality of all men as well as the
natural character and equality of their republics. Then, in a context of natural law and the limits of
state power, I will consider Suárez’s positions on the jus gentium (law of nations) and war. Next, I
will consider Suárez’s divisions of non-Christians and his views on preaching the Gospel to people
like the American Indians.
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INTRODUCTION * *
As is well known, the century following Columbus's discovery of the New World was, for Spain, El Siglo de Oro (The
Century of Gold). The appellation was well deserved. In just
about every area, Spain led the way. Politically, first with the
Catholic sovereigns Ferdinand and Isabella, and then with the
Habsburg monarchies of the Emperor Charles V (1516-1556)
and his son King Philip II (1556-1598), Spanish hegemony was
at its zenith.' For most of the century, Spain's military might
in Western Europe was unequalled. Its ability to project that
might across thousands of sea-miles to the Americas, the Philippine Islands, and the Far East was astonishing even as we
contemplate it today. In ecclesiastical politics, in theology, and
in spirituality, Spanish influence was clear before, during, and
after the Council of Trent (1545-1563).2 In broader fields of
university education, humanistic learning, literature, and art,
Spaniards excelled.3 With the 1534 founding and then the exProfessor of Philosophy, St. Louis University.
•* The footnotes of this Article contain extensive Latin quotations from
*

Suirez's writings. The bulk of Suirez's writings are not widely available in English.
Translations for much of the Latin in succeeding footnotes can be found in
SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ, SJ., Vol. II, The
Translations, prepared by Gwladys L. Williams, et al., in 20 THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown Scott, ed., 1944). The author, while conversant
with the James Brown Scott translation, is not in full agreement with all of the
translations; consequently, we are providing cross-references, rather than
translations. Wherever available, such cross-references have been indicated by page
references to this volume in brackets following the quotations.
1. For an overview here, see generally JOHN LYNCH, SPAIN UNDER THE HABSBURGS. VOLUME ONE: EMPIRE AND ABSOLUTISM,

1516-1598 (2d ed. 1981).

2. Some names here might include: Cardinal Xim~nes de Cisneros (1436-1517),
St. Thomas of Villanueva (1488-1555), St. Teresa of Avila (1515-1562), St. John of
the Cross (1542-1591), Andr~s de Vega (1498-1560), and Alfonso Salmer6n (15151585).
3. In theology and philosophy, leading all others is the "Spanish Socrates,"
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pansion of the Jesuits, by the end of the sixteenth century that
excellence and influence was waxing stronger.
Throughout the golden century, however, ethical doubts
festered with regard to the newly encountered peoples and territories. By what right had the Spaniards assumed dominion
over the nations and lands of the Americas? Was it in any
manner moral for one nation without provocation simply to
impose its rule upon another? Asked in an exclusively European context, a query like this would receive a negative reply.
But what of barbarous unbelievers? Could they not be conquered for their own good? That is to say, could they not and
should they not be subjected to the Spaniards in order to receive civilization and Christianity? Indeed, did not the
Spaniards have a natural imperative, rooted in humanity itself,
to civilize such people, as well as a supernatural one, rooted in
Catholic Faith, to evangelize them?
By the time Francisco Suairez came to address them, the
main questions raised by the evangelization of the American
Indians were pretty much settled for Catholic theologians.
The renowned "Father of International Law," Francisco de Vitoria, O.P., in his famous Relectiones de Indis, delivered at Salamanca in January and June of 1539, had laid down what became the common view. 4 In brief, for Vitoria and his successors the Indians were human beings, lords of their own lives
ard possessions, and it was not lawful to subjugate and despoil
them without just cause-even in order to civilize and to Christianize them.
Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546). Among the Dominican successors of Vitoria, deserving special reference are Domingo de Soto (1494-1560), Melchior Cano (15091560), and Domingo Bafiez (1528-1604). Of the Jesuits, one must mention Francisco
de Toledo, also known as Toletus (1533-1596), Gabriel Vizquez (1549-1604), Luis
de Molina (1535-1600), and, of course, Francisco Suirez (1548-1617). Others
outside this context include Antonio de Nebrija (1442-1522), Juan Luis Vives (14921540), and Miguel de Cervantes (1547-1616). In art, there is first the adopted Spaniard El Greco (1541-1614), and in the 17th century Francisco de Zurbarin (15981664) and Velfisquez (1599-1661) as well.
4. For the critical text of the Relectiones de Indis, see Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio

de Indis, o libertad de los Indios, in 5

CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE

(Luciano Perefia and

J.M. P6rez Prendes eds., edici6n bilingue 1961) [hereinafter CORPUS HISPANORUM DE
PACE], and Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio de lure Belli o paz dindmica. Escuela espaniola de la
paz. Primerageneracidn1526-1560, in 6 CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE (Luciano Perefia
et al. eds., 1981). For a recent English translation, see FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS

233 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991).
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As we shall see, this squares with the beliefs of Sufirez.
While the position Suirez took was general and made almost
no mention of the American Indians, its application to them is
unmistakable. In this Article, I will trace Suairez's thoughts on
the natural equality of all men as well as the natural character
and equality of their republics. Then, in a context of natural
law and the limits of state power, I will consider Suirez's positions on thejus gentium (law of nations) and war. Important at
that juncture is Suirez's emphasis on the international character of thejus gentium and its influence on his attitudes towards
non-Christians and their political arrangements. Next, I will
consider Suirez's divisions of non-Christians and his views on
preaching the Gospel to people like the American Indians.
Here his questions concern the Church's right to preach the
Gospel to all nations and especially the extent of that right
when it comes to non-Christian peoples and rulers not subject
to Christian power. But first let me fill in some of the background on Sufirez himself and on the sources for this Article.
I. SUAREZ-THE MAN, HIS WORK, AND HIS INFLUENCE
Francisco Suirez was born at Granada in Spain on January
5, 1548.' In the autumn of 1561 he enrolled at what was then
the finest university in the world, Salamanca. 6 Here he studied
law until at sixteen years of age he heard the call of God and
entered, onJune 16, 1564, into the fledgling Society ofJesus.7
After three months in the novitiate at Medina del Campo, his
Jesuit superiors sent him back to the Society's College at Salamanca to begin at seventeen the study of philosophy. 8 In October 1566, following his first vows as ajesuit, Sufirez went on to
5. See 1 RAOUL DE SCORRAILLE, S.J., FRANgOIS SUAREZ DE LA COMPAGNIE DEJASUS
3 (1911). This work is still the chief source on Suirez's life. In English, see JOSEPH
FICHTER, MAN OF SPAIN, FRANCIS SUAREZ 6 (1940).

For a briefer but still accurate

presentation, see P. MONNOT, Suarez, Francois.L Vie et oeuvres, in 14 DICTIONNAIRE DE
THiOLOGIE CATHOLIQUE, 20 partie, cols. 2638-49 (1941). On Sufirez's ancestry, see
Jos6 de Duenas, S.J., Los Sudrez de Toledo, in 133 RAZ6N Y FE 91 (mimero extraordinario 1948).
6. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 30; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 29.
7. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 45-46; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 48-50. It is
cited as "a matter of later history" that Sufirez asked to remain a lay brother in the
Society of Jesus "since he himself was convinced that he could not successfully com-

plete even the fundamental course in philosophy." Id. at 52.
8. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 52; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 53.
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theological studies, still at Salamanca. 9
At that time the Jesuits did not have enough theologians
to staff the faculties under which their students were enrolled,
so Sua'rez's class received a rather eclectic, but nevertheless
first-rate, training from professors on the University faculty of
theology.' 0 Chief among Suirez's mentors here was the Dominican, Juan Mancio (1497-1576), who was himself first a pupil and then, in Salamanca's principal chair (cathedra de prima)
of theology, a successor of the great Vitoria."
Following his theological studies, Suirez in 1570 began to
12
teach philosophy, initially at Salamanca as a Scholastic tutor,
and then as a regular professor at the Jesuit college in Segovia.' 3 It was here that he was ordained a priest in March of
1572.1' After ordination, he continued to lecture in philosophy until September 1574, when, at the Jesuit college in Valladolid, he commenced his main life's work as a theology
teacher. 5 Later he taught his subject at Avila (1575), Segovia
(1575), Valladolid again (1576), Rome (1580), Alcalat (1585),
and Salamanca (1593).16
Meanwhile, in 1581 Philip II of Spain had united the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal. 17 Sixteen years later, Suirez,
complying with a request by Philip to the Jesuits, assumed the
9. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 84.
10. FICHTER, supra note 5, at 79.
11. Id. at 79-80 explains that
[p]erhaps in no other university in the world is there to be found so brilliant
a succession of professors as that which filled the principal chair of theology
at Salamanca during the sixteenth century. Suirez' teacher, Mancio, was the
fifth of the line which started with the great Francis Vittorio in 1526, and
ended with the controversial Dominic Bafiez in 1604. In the order in which
they followed Vittorio these outstanding Dominican scholars were: Melchior
Cano, Dominic de Soto, Peter de Sotomayor, John Mancio, Bartholomew de
Medina, and Dominic Bafiez. All of these men enter intimately into the life
of Francis Suirez; those before Mancio, his teacher, because of their influence on his development; those after Mancio because he knew them personally and was sometimes at odds with them.
Id.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 118.
Id. at 130; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 94.
1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 133; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 96.
1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 149; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 107.
See generally FICHTER, supra note 5, at 107-98.
See LYNCH, supra note 1, at 322-30.
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principal chair of theology at the University of Coimbra. "
Here he remained, teaching and participating in theological
discussions, until his retirement at the end of the academic
year, 1614-15. Two years later, on September 25, 1617, he
died in Lisbon.'"

From 1590 on, Suarez's literary production was Herculean, with volume after volume appearing in his own lifetime
or published posthumously by his friend and literary executor,
Baltasar Alvarez.2 ° One can see the extent of this labor in any
of the several editions of Suirez's Opera Omnia published after
1617. The most accessible of these, and the one to which I will
refer in this Article, comprises twenty-six volumes of text, most

running close to 1000 pages, in quarto! 2 1 One author, who

"conservatively estimated" Suairez's output at "upwards of
twenty-one million words," has commented:
This would account for more than two hundred and eighty
novels of seventy-five thousand words apiece. Truly a gigantic task for any author, but when we consider that all of
Suirez's work was done in the highly precise and technical
fields of theology, philosophy, and law, the comparison between him and a modern novelist limps badly. Prolific is a
weak adjective to apply to him.22
Among the volumes of his writings, the great majority are

naturally of a theological character. This, however, is not to
say that they lack importance outside the field of theology it18. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 335; FiCHTER, supra note 5, at 208.
19. 2 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 223; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 325-27.
20. In this connection,
Suarez

laissait

un

certain

nombre

d'ouvrages

tout

prrparrs

pour

l'impression; mais l'apparition de tel d'entre eux se trouvait diffhre sine die
par l'interdiction de rien publier sur le sujet des controverses de auxiliis. Les
autres, pendant les dix ans qui suivirent la mort de Suarez, furent presque
tous 6ditrs par le P. Balthazar Alvarrs, son collgue et son ami, qui 6dita
aussi les cours que Suarez avait laissrs sans pouvoir lui-m~me en faire la
revision.
MONNOT, supra note 5, col. 2641. For a succinct account of the controversy, "de aux-

iris," in which, however, the name of Suirez is unfortunately omitted, see Antonio
Astrain, Congregatio de Auxiliis, in 4 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 238-39 (1913). On
Baltasar Alvarez, see CARLOS SOMMERVOGEL, 1 BIBLIOTH9QUE DE LA COMPAGNIE DE
Jfsus 221-22 (1890).
21. See FRANCISCUS SUkREZ, S.J., OPERA OMNIA (Carolus Berton, ed., 1856-66 &
Supp. 1878) [hereinafter OPERA OMNIA]. Unless otherwise noted, later references to

and citations of Suirez will be from this edition.
22. FiCHTER, supra note 5, at 327.
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self. Quite the contrary. Some of this majority have had widespread influence even up to our time, especially in areas of philosophy and jurisprudence. For particular mention here, let
me single out the De Legibus Seu de Deo Legislatore (On Laws or
on God the Lawgiver) (De Legibus), published at Coimbra in
1612, and the Defensio Fidei Catholicae (A Defense of the Catholic Faith) (Defensio Fidei), published at Coimbra in 1613. About
both of these I will say more in the immediately following section. But to emphasize the importance of Suirez's output, especially for modern international law, one may recall that, in
the opinion of Hugo Grotius, our Jesuit doctor was a philosopher and theologian of such penetration "that he hardly had
' 23
an equal.
II. THE SOURCES FOR THIS ARTICLE
As already mentioned, for Catholic theologians the question of the evangelization of the Indians was largely settled in
the wake of Vitoria.2 4 While there is no mistaking the fact that
he was thinking of Vitoria and the American experience,
Suirez, to my knowledge, unambiguously referred to the
American Indians and their conquest only once, apart from citations of the titles of Vitoria's works. Moreover, he made no
reference to the well-known advocate of the Indians,
Bartolom6 de las Casas, 2 5 to Las Casas's celebrated encounter
with Sepfilveda in 1550-51,26 or to people such as his Jesuit
order-brother Jos6 de Acosta. 27 In this, he moves-even more
23. See 2 DE

SCORRAILLE,

supra note 5,at 437. For some of Suirez's influence on

Grotius as well as on international law generally, see J. Larequi, S.J., Influencia
suareciana en lafilosofib de Grocio, in 88 RAz6N Y FE 525, 525-38 (1929); Isidoro Ruiz
Moreno, El derecho internacionaly Francisco Sudrez, in 2 ACTAS DEL IV CENTENARIO DEL
NACIMIENTO DE FRANCISCO SUAREZ (1548-1948), at 331 (1949).
24. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
25. See B. DE LAS CASAS, IN DEFENSE OF THE INDIANS: THE DEFENSE OF THE MOST
REVEREND LORD, DON FRAY BARTOLOM9 DE LAS CASAS, OF THE ORDER OF PREACHERS,
LATE BISHOP OF CHIAPA, AGAINST THE PERSECUTORS AND SLANDERERS OF THE PEOPLES
OF THE NEW WORLD DISCOVERED ACROSS THE SEAS (Stafford Poole, C.M. ed. & trans.,

1974); see also B. de Las Casas, De regia potestate, o, Derecho de autodeterminacicn, in 8
CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE, supra note 4.
26. See generally LEWIS HANKE, ALL MANKIND IS ONE: A STUDY OF THE DISPUTATION BETWEEN BARTOLOMt DE LAS CASAS AND JUAN GINCS DE SEPOLVEDA IN 1550 ON
THE INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS CAPACITY OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1974). See V.

Beltrin de Heredia, O.P., El maestro Domingo de Solo en la controversia de Las Casas con
Sepilveda, in 45 CIENCIA TOMISTA 35-49, 177-93 (1932).
27. See Acosta, De procuranda Indorum salute: pacificacidn y colonizacidn, in 23-24
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strikingly than Vitoria did earlier-away from a case-by-case
consideration of particulars and toward principles involved at a
more universal level. 28 He does this almost entirely in eight
works.
First and most important is the Tractatus defide (Treatise on
Faith) (De Fide). Originally composed in 1583 at the Jesuit Collegium Romanum 29 as lectures on the opening questions of
Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae I-I, this treatise was recently edited from four manuscripts and published in three
parts.30 The second of these parts contains the one unambiguous reference just mentioned. 3 ' The De Fide itself was revised
again for lectures at Coimbra in 1613-14, Surez's last year of
teaching.3 2 Finally, all that the master left behind was combined and published by Alvarez in a 1621 volume, which also
included shorter treatments of hope and charity from the period of Sua'rez's Roman teaching.33 Along the way, the menhis "Estudio preliminar" to this work, tells us that at one point Suirez, with a letter to the Cardinal
Archbishop of Toledo, did play some role in a dispute involving Acosta. Luciano
Perefia, Estudio preliminar, in 23 CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE, supra note 4, at 25 &
n.35 (1984). I have not as yet been able to see a copy of this letter. De Scorraille has
translated some parts of this letter and has summarized the part which directly relates
to evangelization. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 267. However, in neither the
translations nor in the summary is there any mention of Acosta. Henri Bernard, SJ.,
La th orie du protectorat civil des missions en pays indigeine. Ses anticidents et sa justification
CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE, supra note 4. Luciano Perefia, in

thiologiquepar Suarez, in 1937 NOUVELLE R. THtOLOGIQUE 261, also links Suirez with

Acosta but offers only the De Scorraille summary to support that linkage.
28. For this thought in connection with Vitoria, see GUILLERMO FRAILE & TE61 HISTORIA DE LA FILOSOiA ESPANOLA 293-94 (1985). In my opinion it

FILO URDANOz,

is even more fitting with respect to Suirez.
29. On the Jesuit College in Rome, see RICCARDO G. VILLOSLADA, S.J., STORIA
DEL COLLEGIO ROMANO DAL SUO INIZIO (1551) ALLA SOPPRESSIONE DELLA COMPAGNIA
Di GEsO (1773) (1954). For Suirez's teaching at the Jesuit College, see Nikolaus Ory,

SJ., Suarez in Rom: seine r6nische Lehrt6.tigkeit auf Grund handschrifilicher Uberlieferung, in
82 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR KATHOLISCHE THEOLOGIE 133 (1959), and more recently F6lix
Rodriguez, La docencia romana de Sudrez (1580-1585), in 7 CUADERNOS SALMANTINOS DE
FILOSOFiA 295 (1980).

30. See Franciscus Suirez, S.J., De Fide, Secunda Pars, 1583, in 33 ARCHivo TEOL6GICO GRANADINO 191 (Karl Deuringer ed., 1970) [hereinafter De Fide 1I]; Franciscus Sufirez, S.J., De Fide, Secunda Pars, 1583, in 32 ARCHIVO TEOL6Gico GRANADINO 79
(Karl Deuringer ed., 1969) [hereinafter De Fide II]; Franciscus Suirez, SJ., LECTIONES
DE FIDE, ANNO 1583, in COLLEGIO ROMANO HABITAS (Carolus Deuringer ed., 1967)

[hereinafter De Fide].
31. Suirez, De Fide II, supra note 30, at 131.
32. See MONNOT, supra note 5, col. 2647; see also 2 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at
163.
33. 2 DR SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 163. For Alvarez's own rather cryptic com-
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tioned reference was unfortunately removed, perhaps by Alvarez, but more probably by Suarez himself.
The treatise on charity in the Alvarez volume3 4 is also important for our present purposes. More specifically, Disputation XIII (De Bello) of that treatise contains Suairez's teaching
on just war.3 5 Delivered at Rome in the spring of 1584,36 the
treatises on charity and hope were apparently not revised, at
least in any significant way, before their 1621 publication.3"
Nevertheless, the disputation on war is an obviously mature
piece of work. Its particular relevance here may be seen immediately if one recalls that the second of Vitoria's Relectiones de
Indis was on the right of war.3"
Next in order of importance for us is the already mentioned De Legibus. The fruit of Suairez's teaching at Coimbra
between 1601 and 1603, the De Legibus was edited by its author
in 1612 and published that same year at Coimbra.3 9 In the
Proemium to the work, Suirez contended that, inasmuch as all
paternal and legislative authority is derived from God, the universal Father and Lawgiver, a discussion of all law is not surprisingly within the province of a theologian.4" This was furments about its provenance, see 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at vi-vii, 154, 219,
244, 333.
34. See Franciscus Suirez, SJ., Tractatus tertius de Caritate [hereinafter De Caritate],
in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 634-763.
35. Id. at 737-63.
36. See Ory, supra note 29, at 142, 149; Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 308.
37. Balthasar Alvarez, SJ., Ad lectores pro auctore, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note
21, at vi ("Licet vero reliquas de spe et charitate disputationes antequam ad Conimbricensem hanc Academiam vocaretur, in Hispania vel Italia pressius (nimirum pro
schola) explanaret, non possunt tamen auctoris martem et artem non olere.") [730].
The only revisions that I have noticed are cross-references to some of Suirez's own
works later than 1584.
38. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
39. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at xx; 2 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 156;
see 5-6 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21 (reprinting De Legibus). For a modem critical
edition, see Francisco Sufirez, De/ egibus, in 11-17, 21-22 CORPus HISPANORUM DE PACE,
supra note 4.
40. Franciscus Suirez, SJ., Tractatus de legibus et legislatore Deo, Proemium, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at ix [hereinafter De Legibus]. Suirez stated
Nulli mirum videri debet si homini theologiam profitenti leges incidant disHaec tamen non magni momenti sunt, et unico fere verbo

putandae ....

diluuntur, considerando sicut omnem paternitatem, ita etiam omnem legislatorem a Deo derivari, omniumque legum auctoritatem in eum esse ultimo
refundendam. .

.

. Non immerito igitur sub hac saltem ratione omnium

legum discussio est theologicae facultatis ....
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ther evident inasmuch as law is the rule of conscience and it is
the business of theology to provide for consciences. 4 And finally, to Suirez the Catholic faith taught not only how the
commands of God must be obeyed, but also how all natural,
civil, and ecclesiastical law must be observed. Accordingly, it
was a task of the theologian to consider the various kinds of
law.42
Closely allied with the De legibus, both in the time and
place of its composition as well as in much that it treats, is the
Defensio fidei catholicae adversus anglicanaesectae errores, cum responsione ad apologiampro juramentofidelitatis et praefationem monitoriam
serenissimiJacobi Angliae Regis (A Defense of the Catholic Faith
Against the Errors of the Anglican Sect, with a Reply to the
"Apology" for the "Oath of Fidelity" and the "Warning Preface" of James, the Most Serene King of England), which appeared at Coimbra in 1613. 41 In the year of its appearance this
work was condemned by the English King James I and publicly
burned in London, for the reason that in it Suirez had opposed the absolute right of kings and had defended the indirect power of the papacy over temporal rulers, as well as the
legitimate resistance of the citizenry against a tyrannical monarch-even to the point of tyrannicide in the case of a monarch
whom the Pope deposes for heresy.44
Id. [14].
41. Id. at x ("[d]einde theologicum est negotium conscientiis prospicere
viatorum; conscientiarum vero rectitudo stat legibus servandis, sicut et pravitas violandis, cum lex quaelibet sit regula") [14].
42. Id. Suarez stated:
Tandem catholica fides non solum docet, quatenus parendum sit Deo
supernaturaliter praecipienti, sed etiam quid natura vetet,jubeat vel permittat; et quatenus obediendum sit potestatibus sublimioribus, ut Paulus dixit,
atque adeo quatenus parendum sit turn ecclesiasticis legibus, turn laicis, ante
oculos nobis ponit. Ergo ex his fidei fundamentis, theologi est colligere
quid in hoc aut illo legum genere habendum.

Id. [13].
43. The text takes up the whole of
editions of parts of this work, see
PRINCIPATUS POLITIcUs 0 LA SOBERANIA
efia eds., Latin & Spanish ed. 1965) and

24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21. For critical
FRANCISCO SUAREZ, DEFENSio FIDEL III.
POPULAR (Eleuterio Elorduy & Luciano PerFrancisco Suirez, Dejuramentofidelitalis,in 19
CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE, supra note 4.
44. 2 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 193; see id. at 165-22 1; FICHTER, supra note
5, at 290-303. On the general background of Suirez's controversy with King James,
see Francisco Elias de Tejada, Sudrez y el pensamiento inglis contempordneo, in HOMENAJE
AL DR. ExiMIo P. SUAREZ, S.J., EN EL IV CENTENARIO DE SU NACIMIENTO,

at 27-43 (T. Andr~s Marcos et al. eds., 1948).

1548-1948,
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In fifth place is a work that is broadly classifed as Scriptural commentary, the De opere sex dierum (On the Work of the
Six Days [of Genesis]).4 5 Stemming from lectures given in
Spain during the 1570s,46 the De opere sex dierum was revised by
Suirez and was ready at the time of his death for publication
by Alvarez in 1621 at Lyons.4 7 Of special interest here is Book
V, chapter 7, entitled "On Political Life in the State of Inno48
cence."
Next is the Tractatus de Baptismo (Treatise on Baptism).
Originally composed as lectures at Alcali in 1585, the work
was published at Salamanca a decade later.4 9 Most important
in the present context is Disputation 25, sections 3 and 4.50 In
that place, Suirez is concerned with the widely discussed medieval question of baptizing children in contravention of the
desires of their unbelieving parents.
Finally are two works that are partially parallel. Edited in
1958 from a single manuscript 51 is a series of questions entitled De Justitia et Jure (On Justice and Right).52 Representing
lectures dictated by Suirez most probably at Rome in the summer of 1584, 53 these questions in part anticipate material published by the master himself in 1599 under the title Disputatio
de justitia qua Deus reddit praemia meritis et poenas pro peccatis (A
Disputation on the Justice by Which God Gives Rewards for
Merit and Punishments for Sin).5 4
45. See FRANCISCUS SUAREZ, S.J., De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note
21, at 1- 460.
46. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 149.
47. See MONNOT, supra note 5, col. 2645.
48. See generally Su(irez, De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at
413-19 ("Quod genus vitae corporalis, seu politicae, homines in statu innocentiae

profiterentur").
49. See 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 246, 328-29; MONNOT, supra note 5, col.
2643.
50. See Franciscus Suirez, S.J., Tractatus de Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra
note 21, at 428-36 [hereinafter De Baptismo].
51. Codex 534 of the Archivio Universitd Gregoriana.
52. See generally FRANCISCUS SUAREZ, DIE GERECHTIGKEITSLEHRE DES JUNGEN
SUAREZ: EDITION UND UNTERSUCHUNG SEINER ROMISCHEN VORLESUNGEN "DE IUSTI-

TIA ET lURE" (Joachim Giers ed., 1958) [hereinafter DE JUSTITIA ET JURE].
53. Id. at 27. For the problems encountered both by Giers and Ory in dating
this treatise, see Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 308-10.
54. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 319. The text appears in 11 FRANCISCUS
SUAREZ, S.J., OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 514-82.
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III. SOME PRELIMINARY POINTS OF DOCTRINE
A. The Natural Condition of Human Beings
Any sixteenth century discussion of the Indians of the New
World was bound to take place, at least in part, against the
background of Aristotle's division of men into those fitted by

nature to rule and those who were by nature "slaves." 55
Picked up and benignly interpreted by Thomas Aquinas,5 6 the
Aristotelian division of human beings was at hand for the academic discussions of the nature of the newly discovered people
of America and the consequent attitudes of Europeans toward
them.5 7 Most probably the first Scholastic doctor to address
such questions was the Scottish theologian John Major (14691550).58 Writing in 1510, Major regarded the Indians of the
New World as being among the natural slaves to which Aristotle alluded. By implication, then, they were naturally destined to be ruled by more advanced Europeans. 59 Cardinal
Cajetan opposed this opinion of Major in 151760 as did Vitoria6 1 and his disciples quite explicitly later.6 2
Suairez was, of course, very much aware of Aristotle's division of men and the division of sixteenth century Scholastics
55. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1254a18-1255a2, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARIS(Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
56. See THOMAS AQUINAS, IN LIBROS POLITICORUM ARISTOTELIS EXPOSITIO I, lectio III, & nos. 56-74 (R. Spiazzi, O.P. ed., 1951); see also Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS II-II, question 57, art. 3,
ad. 2 (Anton C. Pegis ed. & Laurence Shapcote, O.P. trans., 1945).
57. To English readers this subject is perhaps best known from the work of
Lewis K. Hanke. See, e.g., LEWIS K. HANKE, ARISTOTLE AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS
(1959); LEWIS K. HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF
AMERICA (1945); HANKE, supra note 26.
58. See OBRAS DE FRANCISCO DE VITORIA: RELECCIONES TEOL6GICAS 498-99 (T.
TOTLE

Urdinoz ed., 1960) [hereinafter OBRAS DE VITORIA] ("La primera obra teol6gica conocida que plantea expresamente el tema de la legitimidad de la conquista de los
pueblos infieles que 'los espafioles encontraron en el mar Atldntico' es del nominalista

Maior o Juan Mair. Se trata de su Libro I de los Sentencias, publicado en 1510.").
59. For this, seeJOHN MAJOR, COMMENTARIA IN II SENT., disp. 44, question 3; id.
question 9, no. 4; see URDANOZ, supra note 58, at 499 n.13 (citing MAJOR).
60. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 56, II-II, question 66, art.

8, no. 1, where Major and the American Indians are plainly implied, even though
neither is mentioned by name.

61. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. On the issue as between Major and
Vitoria, see Pedro de Leturia, Maior y Vitoria ante la Conquistade America, in 11 ESTUDIOS
ECLESIASTICos

44 (1932).

62. See Demetrio Ramos et al., Franciscode Vitoria y la escuela de Salamanca: La Etica
en la conquista de Amyi'ca, in 25 CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE, supra note 4.
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relative to it. 6 3 His own view was simple and direct. It was
incredible, he believed, to say that all the people (homines) in
any region or province have been born "monstrous and in a
way that contradicts the natural disposition" of human beings
to be free. 64 In fact, he believed all men were equally capable
of dominion over themselves and their possessions inasmuch
as all were made in the image of God. 65 No natural law or positive divine law existed by which some could be excluded from

this privilege, and no conditions were required for dominion
that may not be found in all human beings.6 6
67
B. The Natural and Yet Voluntary Origin of the State

Indeed, from the very beginning of the human race in the
Garden of Paradise, man was by nature free.6 8 Had man not
sinned, there would have been no want in Paradise. As a result, even though one man might in charity have served another, no one would have been slave to any other. 69 And yet
Suairez affirmed that even if men had remained sinless in the
Garden, some political power to direct and to govern would
have eventually existed. 70 For, as Aristotle well put it, man is
63. For places in which he has referred to it, see SUAREZ, DE JUSTITIA ETJURE,
supra note 52, at 77, question 6; Franciscus Sufirez, S.J., Tractatus de Fide, in 12 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 449, disp. 18, § 4, no. 2 [hereinafter De Fide]; Sufirez, De
Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 747, disp. 13, § 5, no. 5.
64. SUAREZ, DEJUSTITIA ETJURE, supra note 52, at 77 ("Dicere autem generaliter
in aliqua regione aut provincia omnes homines nasci monstrosos et contra naturalem
dispositionem incredibile est.").

65. See, e.g., id. ("Quia omnes homines sunt ad imaginem Dei facti, ratione cuius
sunt capaces dominii, Gen. 1 (2)."); see also Franciscus Sufirez, S.J., Defensiofidei, in 24
OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 203, III, ch. 1, no. 2.
66. SUAREZ, DE JUSTITIA ET JURE, supra note 52, at 77 ("Neque est aliquod jus
naturale vel positivum divinum, quo aliqui sint exclusi. Neque conditiones ullae ad
dominium requiruntur, quae non in omnibus hominibus inveniantur.").
67. For Suirez's teaching on the state, see HEINRICH ROMMEN, LA TEORiA DEL
ESTADO Y DE LA COMMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL EN FRANCISCO SUAREZ (V. Garcia Yebra

trans. from the German, 1951).
68. See SUAREZ, De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 416, V, ch.
7, no. 10 ("libertas est homini naturalis, et magna ejus perfectio"); see also SUAREZ, De
Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 180, III, ch. 2, no. 3.

69. SUAREZ, De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 415, V, ch. 7,
no. 10; id. at 417, no. 16.
70. Id. at 416 n. 1I ("Secundo dicimus, dominium directivum, seu gubernativum
futurum fuisse inter homines in statu innocentiae."); see SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 179, III, ch. 1, no. 12. Note however that this power was
not conferred by nature upon any one man, even Adam. See id. at 180, ch. 2, no. 3.
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by nature a political animal. 7 ' Thus, coming together into a
city-state was not the result of sin, but was instead essential to
human beings and consonant with their perfection.7 2 In fine,
the state, political authority, governance and subjection were
not punishment for sin but rather arose from nature. 73 Important for this Article is the point that, in such a naturally emanating state a common rule of faith, in fact a common Church,
would be most fitting. 74 Finally, while a human community as
such has political power naturally, it could exercise it in different ways voluntarily. 7 5
This last thought is uppermost in both the De Legibus and
the Defensio Fidei. At its very origin, Sua'rez believed, the state
is natural but also voluntary.7 6 As Su'trez saw it, free men, naturally impelled to political association, must nevertheless
agree to it. Accordingly, the state itself arises out of a social
contract, or, better, "a consensus," either explicit or tacit,
freely entered upon by all.7 7 Furthermore, it is the prerogative
of those entering it to limit the contract in greater or lesser
degree. 78 For this reason, men are not forced by nature to
71. SUAREZ, De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 414, III, ch.
7, no. 5; see SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 176, III, ch. 1, no.
3 ("Primum est hominem esse animal sociale et naturaliter recteque appetere in communitate vivere."); see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 55, 1253a2.
72. SUAREZ, De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 415, V, ch. 7,
no. 6 ("conjunctio hominum in unam civitatem, non per accidens tantum ratione
peccati, aut corruptionis naturae, sed per se convenit homini in quocumque statu, et
ad perfectionem ejus pertinet").
73. Id.; see id. at 416, no. 12.
74. Id. at 415 no. 7 ("Nam oporteret homines habere communem regulam fidei
etiam externam, ut eamdem fidem conservare perpetuo possent, et secundum illam
colere Deum, non solum privatim, sed etiam cultu publico totius communitatis, seu
Ecclesiae. Haec autem ecclesiastica unitas supponit communitatem civilem statui
hominum accommodatam."). For a fuller understanding of this point, see SUAREZ,
De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 331-32, V, ch. 2, nos. 3-4. For much
the same thought, see OBRAS DE VITORIA, supra note 58, at 280, question 4, no. 1.
75. See SUAREZ, De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 416, V, ch.
7, no. 13.
76. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 184, III, ch. 4, no. 1
("licet haec potestas absolute sit de jure naturae, determinatio ejus ad certum
modurn potestatis et regiminis est ex arbitrio humano" [382]).
77. SUAREZ, De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 414, V, ch. 7,
no. 3; see SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 182-83, III, ch. 3,
nos. 1, 6, 7; SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 210, 212, III,
ch. 2, nos. 11-12, 19.
78. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 184, III, ch. 4, no.
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choose any particular form of state, 79 and in fact there are different kinds of states existing in different regions.80 But, important for our present purpose, Sufirez believed that there is a
natural equality among all of these states and the political
power they exercise. 8 ' Concretely, this will mean that civil
power, precisely as such, will not be greater in Christian
princes than in pagan princes.8 2
While democracy had a certain natural priority,8" in practice democracy was not the best kind of government for
Sufrez. Rather, he believed that this label belonged to some
form of monarchy.8 4 What form a monarchy took and how
much power any monarch would have would depend upon the
terms of the initial grant of the people.8 5 In this way, civil authority or power was ultimately from nature, and nature's God,
but immediately in different ways through the people.8 6
1. ("est major vel minorjuxta varias consuetudines etjudicia hominum: pendet ergo
tota haec res ex humano consilio et arbitrio") [383].
79. Id. ("Stando ergo in jure naturali non coguntur homines eligere
determinatum unum ex his modis gubernationis.") [383].
80. SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 208, III, ch. 2, no.
7.
81. SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 739, disp. 13, § 2,
no. 1 ("in omnibus enim est eadem ratio") [806].
82. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 214, III, ch. 11, no. 9
("potestas haec ut nunc est in principibus Christianis, in se non est major, nec alterius naturae quam fuerit in principibus ethnicis"); see id. at 189, ch. 5, no. 7 ("sequitur
reges gentium priusquam ad Ecclesiam veniant esse veros reges, si justo titulo regna
possident" [808]); see also SUAREZ, De Caritale, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at
740, disp. 13, § 2, no. 4. ("quae omnia, cum in lege naturali fundata sint, communia
sunt Christianis et infidelibus"); id. at 747, § 5, no. 3; SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 449, disp. 18, § 4, no. 3 [hereinafter De Fide]; id. at 451, § 5,
no. 8; SUAREZ, Defensio Fidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 348, III, ch. 30, no.
4; Suirez, De Fide I, supra note 30, at 196, disp. 5, question 2.
83. SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 208-09, III, § 2,
nos. 8-9. For Suirez's general teaching here, see generally Antonio Alvarez de
Linera, La Democracia en ladoctina de Sudrez, 4 PENSAMIENTO 509 (1948).
84. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 184, III, ch. 4, no.
1.
85. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 212, III, ch. 2,
no. 18.
86. See id. at 211 ("Deus est qui distribuit regna et principatus politicos, sed per
homines, seu consensus populorum, vel aliam similem institutionem humanam."); id.
n.17; SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 435, disp. 25, § 4, no.
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C. Limitations on State Power

On a number of occasions, Suirez spoke of the state as
"supreme in its own order."8 7 This means that the state as
such has power to enact laws from which there is no appeal to
any tribunal beyond itself8 s As we shall see, even when Suirez
considered thejus gentium as a law among the nations, it was
not coupled with any notion of a super-government or a world
court to which one might look to overturn a sovereign state's
laws. Yet, the supremacy of a state or a prince was not absolute.8 9
Although the people in theory retained power over their
government, Sufirez believed that ordinarily the gift of political
power is all but irrevocable. 90 At the same time, we already
noted the fact that people could transfer political power to a
greater or lesser degree.9 ' In accord with this, as the common
good demands, that power could be in different times and different circumstances changed or limited.9 2 Connected here is
the mentioned power of the Pope to depose a tyrannical

ruler.

93

87. 'E.g., SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 225, III, ch.
5, no. 2; id. at 226 no. 6; id. at 350, ch. 30, no. 11; SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 177, III, ch. 1, no. 6; see SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA,

supra note 21, at 443, disp. 18, § 2, no. 6; id. at 449, § 4, no. 3. On the meaning of
"supreme in its own order," see Luis SANCHEZ AGESTA, ESPARJA AL ENCUENTRO DE

96-108 (1971).
88. SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 740, disp. 13, § 2,
no. 4 ("signum supremi jurisdictionis est, quando apud talem principem, rempublicamve, est tribunal, in quo terminantur omnes causae illius principatus, neque appellatur ad aliud tribunal superius") [808].
89. For Suirez's general doctrine here, see Georges Jarlot, Les idees politiques de
Suarez et lepouvoir absolu, in 18 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE, cahier 1, at 64 (1949). For
reference to the Spanish encounter with the peoples of the New World, see id. at 71 72. At this place, I note that Suirez explicitly opposed the doctrines of Machiavelli.
See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 215, III, ch. 12, no. 2.
90. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 186-87, III, ch. 4,
nos. 6, 11.
91. See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see infra note 92 and accompanying
text.
92. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 216, III, ch. 3,
no. 13 ("Potestas autem regia vel cujusvis supremi tribunalis temporalis, potuit a
principio major vel minor constitui, et successu temporum poterit mutari aut minui,
prout ad bonum commune expediens fuerit, per eum qui ad hoc habuerit potestatem."). In context, the one "who would have power for this" is the Pope. See
SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 183-84, lII, ch. 3, nos. 7-8.
93. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 183-84, III, ch. 3,
EUROPA
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Other limitations occurred inasmuch as state power
stopped short of the private zone of families and individuals,9 4
for these are by nature prior to the state.95 Moreover, human
beings are not just citizens of this world. While not denying a
republic's legitimate concern for the virtue of its members,
Sua'rez suggested that even at a natural level, each person aims
at a final happiness that transcends the reach of civil power and
civil laws.9 6 And beyond this natural destiny, in fact God gave
men a supernatural revelation and a Church, through which
97
He called all to a supernatural goal of union with Himself.
Much less, then, will state power and laws reach to this level of
human reality. 98 An example of this limitation is furnished by
Sua'rez's dismissal of any right of Christian temporal rulers to
forcibly baptize the children of non-apostate unbelievers,
whether these are politically subject to them or not.99 At the
same time, he did think that Christian lawgivers could, and in
part should, look to the supernatural destiny of men and
should relate their very activity of lawmaking to it. 0 0 In agreenos. 7-8; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text. For Suirez's view on the deposition and execution of tyrants, see SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra
note 21, at 675-82, VI, ch. 4.
94. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 214, III, ch. 11,
no. 8 ("Potestas autem civilis per se ordinatur ad gubernationem politicam, . . . et
ideo per se non dirigit oeconomicum regimen, nisi in his quae redundant in commune bonum civitatis, et illud possunt impedire aut promovere: reliqua enim quae
ad privatam familiam spectant, non per leges civiles, sed per uniuscujusque patrisfamilias prudentiam ordinantur. Ergo simili proportione ac ratione non spectat ad
leges civiles monastica directio, seu privata honestas singulorum, ut tales sunt, sed
solum ea morum rectitudo per has leges constituitur, quae bono civili vel necessaria,
vel valde utilis est."); see also SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21,
at 436, disp. 25, § 4, no. 6.
95. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 176, III, ch. 1, no.

3.
96. Id. at 214, ch. 11, no. 8 ("Ad felicitatem autem etiam naturalem uniuscujusque hominis, ut singularis persona est, non sufficit virtus illa civilis .... ergo non
spectat felicitas privata ad finem proprium legis civilis seu potestatis legislativae mere
naturalis.").
97. On the distinction between natural and supernatural happiness as the goal
of human existence, see SUAREZ, SJ., De ultimofine hominis, in 4 OPERA OMNIA, supra
note 21, at 43-44, disp. 4, § 3, nos. 1-4.
98. See SUAREZ, De Legibus in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 214, III, ch. 11,
no. 9 ("dico potestatem hanc civilem ... non extendi in materia vel actibus suis ad
finem supernaturalem seu spiritualem vitae futurae vel praesentis").
99. SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 435, disp. 25, § 4,
no. 4.
100. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 214, 111, ch. 11, no.
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ment with this, on a number of occasions he assigned a "ministerial" role to civil power with respect to the higher order of
Christian life and religion. 10 '
This last brings us to the question of Church and state.
For Suirez, as we have seen, while temporal power was ultimately from God, immediately its origin was natural and
human.10 2 In contrast, the power of the Church was directly of
divine origin, "from the special promise and grant of
Christ." 10 3 Although there were in fact many temporal states
throughout the world, there is only one Church. 0 4 Between
any state and the Church there was a clear difference of purpose. While the end of a state is the common temporal good,
which Sua'rez called "political happiness" and which does involve the natural moral goodness of its members, 10 5 the end 0of6
Church power is the eternal salvation of its members.1
Although each is "supreme in its own order,"' l0

7

the funda-

mental relation between the two is hierarchical. According to
Suirez, just as the body is to the soul, so the temporal state
should be subordinate to the Church. 08 The power of the
state was directly and exclusively within the temporal order. 0 9
9 ("licet ipsi legislatores fideles in suis legibus ferendis, intueri possint et ex parte
debeant supernaturalem finem, et actum ipsum ferendi legem in supernaturalem
finem referre").
101. See, e.g., SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 438,
disp. 25, § 4, no. 10; SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 455, disp.
18, § 5, no. 9; SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 205, III, ch.
1, no. 7.
102. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
103. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 236, III, ch.
6, no. 17 ("potestas ecclesiastica est de jure divino positivo, et ex speciali promissione et concessione Christi"); id. at 239, ch. 7, no. 4.
104. See id. at 228, III, ch. 5, no. 11; id. at 234, ch. 6, no. 11.
105. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 55, I, ch. 13, no. 7
("finis humanae reipublicae est vera felicitas politica, quae sine moribus honestis esse
non potest"); id. at 30, ch. 7, no. 4. On the end of the state, see ROMMEN, supra note
67, at 201-24.
106. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 236-37, III,
ch. 6, no. 17 ("Potestas autem ecclesiastica ad aeternam salutem consequendam
ordinatur"); see also SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 362, IV,
ch. 8, no. 2.
107. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 350, III, ch.
30, no. 11.
108. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 366, IV, ch. 9,
no. 3 ("ergo necesse est ut ei subdatur temporalis potestas, sicut corpus animae").
109. Id. at 223, III, ch. 13, no. 3.
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That of the Church is directly within the spiritual order.1 10 Indirectly, however, the Church had power over a Christian state
even in temporal matters."' Conversely, civil power, at least
in Christian states, should be indirectly dependent upon and at
the service of the higher goal of the Church." 2 Suirez acknowledged in this a certain inequality between Christian and
infidel princes inasmuch as the latter are not in principle subject even indirectly to the Church. However, he considered it a
plus for Christian states and sovereigns that their power is
raised to a new height in its subordination to the Church."'
Yet another limitation on the power of the temporal state
came from the existence of other states. As each was
''supreme in its own order," none had an unconditioned right
to encroach upon another. The power and laws of one end
4
where those of another begin." 1
D. The Jus Gentium or The Law of Nations 115
1. Some Background
Despite their diversity, states, to Sufirez, were not so independent or exclusive of one another as to be subject to no
common law. Instead, he believed that however much it is divided into various peoples and kingdoms, the human race itself
had a unity that was not only specific but also "quasi-political
and moral." ' 1 6 An indication of this was a natural impulse,
110. Id. at 366, IV, ch. 9, no. 3.
111. d. at 192-93, III, ch. 6, nos. 3-4; see SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 309-10, III, ch. 22, nos. 5-7.
112. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 224-25, III,
ch. 5, no. 2; id. at 351, ch. 30, no. 11; see also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
113. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 348-49, III,
ch. 30, no. 5 ("[e]t non est imperfectio, sed potius excellentia illius potestatis, ideoque non addit gravamen vel impedimentum"); id. at 349, nos. 3-6.
114. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 300, III, ch. 31,
no. 8; id. at 301, ch. 32, no. 4.
115. On this subject, the best overall treatment I know is SANTIAGO RAMiREZ,
O.P., EL DERECHO DE GENTES: EXAMEN CRiTICO DE LA FILOSOFiA DEL DERECHO DE
GENTES DESDE ARISTOTELES HASTA FRANCISCO SUAREZ (1955). Santiago Ramirez's
treatment of Suirez at pages 172-78, however, is rather brief and I think too critical.
For a fuller and more laudatory view of Suirez here, see ROMMEN, supra note 67, at

447-506.
116. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 169, II, ch. 19, no. 9
("quia humanum genus quantumvis in varios populos et regna divisum, semper
habet aliquam unitatem non solum specificam, sed etiam quasi politicam et
moralem").
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which amounted to a precept, to have love and compassion for7
all our fellow human beings, even strangers or foreigners."1
Therefore, though each city-state, republic, or kingdom may
be in itself a perfect community,"" nevertheless, each, insofar
as it was human, is also in some way a member of the wider
world." 9 Coupled with this, Sua'rez said:
even though the totality of men were not gathered into one
body politic, but were divided into various communities,
nevertheless, in order that those communities might help
one another and be kept in justice and peace among themselves (which was essential for the good of the universe), it
was imperative that they observe some general laws as it
were by common treaty and consent among themselvesand these are what are called "the laws of nations"-which
have been introduced more by tradition and custom than by
20
some constitution.

Before considering this in more detail, we should say a few
words about Sufrez's general division of law and about the
members of that division which are presupposed by these
"laws of nations."
2. A General Division of Law
In the De Legibus, Suirez divided law first of all into eternal
117. Id. ("quam indicat naturale praeceptum mutui amoris et misericordiae,
quod ad omnes extenditur, etiam extraneos, et cujuscumque rationis").
118. For Suirez's understanding of"a perfect community," see SUAREZ, De opere
sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 413, V, § 7, no. 1; see also SUAREZ, De
Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 740, disp. 13, § 2, no. 4; SUAREZ, De
Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 28, I, ch. 6, no. 19.
119. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 169, 1I, ch. 19, no. 9

("Quapropter licet unaquaeque civitas perfecta, respublica, aut regnum sit in se communitas perfecta, et suis membris constans, nihilominus quaelibet illarum est etiam
membrum aliquo modo hujus universi, prout ad genus humanum spectat") [348].
120. Id. at 181-82, III, ch. 2, no. 6. Suirez stated that
licet universalitas hominum non fuerit congregata in unum corpus
politicum, sed in varias communitates divisa fuerit; nihilominus ut illae communitates sese mutuojuvare, et inter se injustitia et pace conservari possent
(quod ad bonum universi necessarium erat), oportuit ut aliqua communia
jura quasi communi foedere et consensione inter se observarent: et haec
sunt quae appellanturjura gentium, quae magis traditione et consuetudine
quam constitutione aliqua introducta sunt ....

Id. [377].
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and temporal. 12 He then divided temporal law into natural
law and positive law.' 22 Positive law in turn would split into
human law and divine law.' 2 3 Human law could be either civil
or canon. 124 Finally, divine positive law was either that of the
Old Testament or the New Testament. 125 As we shall see, the
"law of nations," or thejus gentium, would be extremely close
to and yet distinct from natural law. Ultimately, it would be a
matter of human positive law. But first, let us briefly speak of
the eternal and the natural law.
3. The Eternal Law
For Suarez, all law stemmed from the "eternal law," which
he considered "a free decree of the will of God establishing the
order to be observed either generally by all parts of the universe in relation to the common good . . . or especially to be
observed by intellectual creatures in their free operations." 126
In so emphasizing the Divine will, he deliberately distinguished
himself from Thomas Aquinas, who identified the eternal law
with the divine reason inasmuch as it governed the whole created universe.1 7 The voluntaristic cast of Sufirez's legal theory
has been recognized, criticized, explained, or defended, by
many others.' 2 8 It is not our task to go further into the matter
121. Id. at 8, 1, ch. 3, no. 6 ("colligi potest prima divisio legis, in aeternam et
temporalem") [40].
122. Id. at 9, no. 7 ("secunda divisio legis colligitur, quae est subdivisio legis
creatae, in naturalem et positivam") [40].
123. Id. at 11, no. 15 ("traditur a theologis tertia divisio legis positivae in
divinam et humanam") [45 NUMBERED AS 14 IN SELECTIONS].
124. Id. at 13, no. 21 ("haec positiva lex in civilem et ecclesiasticam distinguitur") [49 N.20].
125. Id. at 11, no. 16 ("lex divina positiva, prout nunc de ilia loquimur,
ordinarie versatur circa actus exteriores, ut videre licet in lege veteri et in nova" [46
N.15]). Suirez considered the Old Law in Book 9 of the De Legibus and the New Law
in Book 10, which is the last book of that work.
126. Id. at 94, II, ch. 3, no. 6 ("infertur . . . legem aeternam esse decretum
liberum voluntatis Dei statuentis ordinem servandum, aut generaliter ab omnibus
partibus universi in ordine ad commune bonum, . . . aut specialiter servandum a
creaturis intellectualibus quoad liberas operationes earum") [163].
127. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 56, I-II, question 91, art.
1(c).
128. See, e.g., THOMAS DAVITr, S.J., THE NATURE OF LAW 86-108 (1960); Ph.I.
Andr6-Vicent, La notion moderne de droit et le voluntarisme. (De Vitoria et Suarez d Rousseau), in 7 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 238 (1963); F.C. Apell~niz Valderrama, Sobre el pretendido voluntarismojundico de Sudrez, in ESTUDIOS JURiDICO-SOCIALES

449 (1960); William E. May, The Natural Law Doctrine of FrancisSuarez, 58 NEW SCHO-
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here. We will touch it again a little later on. But now, having
simply noted it, let us pass to the natural law which immediately emanates from the eternal law.
4. The Natural Law
As Thomas Aquinas viewed it, the natural law is a participation of the eternal law in a rational creature' 2 9 Suarez accepted this and interpreted it to mean that the natural law resides in the human mind in order to discern what is morally
good and what is evil.'
He further agreed with Aquinas that
natural law was proportionately in human beings what natural
instinct is in brute animals.' 3 ' It was called "natural" not only
in distinction from "supernatural" but also in contrast to
"free."'' 3 2 For Suirez, while persons did not follow it necessarily in the way brutes follow their natural inclinations, wherever
human nature was found natural law was necessarily present
like an essential property placed in it by God.13 3 Following
Thomas Aquinas, and to quote St. Augustine, Sua'rez regarded
34
it as God's law, which is written in the hearts of men.1
The details of Sufrez's treatment of natural law are in De
Legibus, Book two, chapters five to sixteen. In chapter six,
Suirez suggested that the natural law is not only indicative of
good and evil but with regard to these it is also prescriptive
and proscriptive. 3 5 The core of chapter seven, which conLASTICISM 409 (1984); Antonio Messineo, Il voluntarismo suareciano, 100 LA CIVILTA
CATrOLICA 630 (1949); A. Truyol y Serra, La filosofit jundica y polhica de Sudrez, con
especial referencia al problema del voluntarismo, ACTAS I CONGRESO NACIONAL DE FILOSOFiA
501 (1950).
129. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 56, I-II, question 91, art.
2.
130. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 9, I, ch. 3, no. 10
("Lex ergo naturalis propria . . . est ilia quae humanae menti insidet ad discernendum honestum a turpi ....
ut explicuit D. Thomas, d. quaest. 91, art. 2, ubi
concludit legem naturalem esse participationem legis aeternae in rationali creatura.")

[42,

N.9 IN SELECTIONS].

131. Id.
132. Id. ("[ilta ergo haec lex naturalis dicitur, non solum prout distinguitur a
supernaturali, sed etiam prout distinguitur a libero" [42 N.9]).

133. Id. ("quia lex ilia est veluti proprietas quaedam naturae, et quia Deus ipse
illam naturae inseruit") [42 N.9].
134. Id.; see THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICAE, supra note 56, 1-11, question
94, art. 6. On St. Augustine, see SAN AUGUSTIN, Confessiones II, ch. 4, in 2 OBRAS DE
SAN AUGUSTIN 136 (P. Angel Custodio Vega O.S.A. trans., bilingual ed., 1955).
135. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 105, II, ch. 6, no. 5
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cerned the content of natural law, is a division of natural law
precepts into three classes. Su~rez first identified such general
moral principles as "Good must done and evil avoided," and
"Do not do to anyone else what you would not want done to
you."1 36 Next came principles more determined or particular,
but still self-evident from their very terms, such as "Justice
should be observed," and "One should live with self-control."' 13 7 In the third place came conclusions which were evidently inferred from these principles. These conclusions may
be more or less easily or broadly known. Thus it is more easily
and more widely known that such things as adultery and theft
are wrong. 138 Requiring more reasoning, and he thought not
easily known to all, were conclusions like "Fornication is intrinsically evil," "Usury is unjust," and "Lying could never be
'39
justified."'
In chapter eight, Suirez asserted something most important for our present concern. In one and the same way, the
natural law obliges all men, in all conditions, in all times, and
in all places. 140 Expanding this, he suggested that no one in
any way can be invincibly ignorant about the first principles of
the natural law.' 4 ' He allowed that more particular precepts,
including the second class of principles and the first class of
conclusions mentioned in the last paragraph, could be unknown-but not for very long without fault. 142 For he believed
that nature itself, as well as conscience, so urged these
("Lex naturalis non tantum est indicativa mali et boni, sed etiam continet propriam
prohibitionem mali et praeceptionem boni.") [191].
136. Id. at 113, ch. 7, no. 5 ("quaedam sunt prima principia generalia morum, ut
sunt ilia, honestum estfaciendum, pravum vitandum; quod tibifieri non vis, alteri nefeceris, et
similia") [211].
137. Id. ("alia sunt principia magis determinata et particularia, tamen etiam per
se nota ex terminis, ut, justitia est servanda, Deus est colendus, temperate vivendum est, et
similia") [211].
138. Id. ("quaedam facilius eta pluribus cognoscuntur, ut adulterium, furtum, et
similia, prava esse") [211].
139. Id. ("aliae majori indigent discursu, et non facile omnibus notae, ut fornicationem esse intrinsece malam, usuram esse injustam, mendacium nunquam posse
honestari, et similia") [211].
140. Id. at 117, ch. 8, no. 5 ("dicendum est hanc legem naturalem esse unam in
omnibus hominibus, et ubique") [220]; id.at 118 n.8 ("dicendum est hanc legem
naturalem etiam esse unam in omni tempore et statu humanae naturae") [222].
141. Id. no. 7 ("mea sententia breviter est prima principia ignorari non posse
ullo modo, nedum invincibiliter") [221].
142. Id. ("praecepta vero particularia quae vel per se nota sunt, vel facillime ex
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precepts that man could not without fault remain ignorant of
them. 143 As for natural law conclusions, Suirez admitted that
they could be invincibly unknown, at least by the common people, who presumably would be lacking education and sub44

tlety. 1

In chapter thirteen, he suggested that the natural law was
intrinsically immmutable. A quasi-property of human nature,
it would remain completely the same as long as human nature
remained rational and free.' 45 Extrinsically it could change because of what is in fact a changed set of circumstances, what
the Scholastics would call "mutatio materiae."' 46 In chapter
fourteen, he asked whether there was any human power or authority sufficient to change the natural law or to dispense from
14 7
it.

By way of reply he adopted "the common opinion of

theologians": that natural law in none of its true precepts
could be taken away, diminished, dispensed from, or in any
similar way changed, by any human law or power. 148 In chapter fifteen, Sufirez went on to ask whether God, using absolute
power, 49 could dispense in a particular matter of natural
50
law. 1

per se notis colliguntur, ignorari quidem posse, non tamen sine culpa saltem per
longum tempus") [221].
143. Id. ("natura ipsa et conscientia ita pulsat in actibus eorum, ut non permittat
inculpabiliter ignorari, et hujusmodi sunt praecepta Decalogi, ac similia") [222].
144. Id. ("[a]lia vero praecepta, quae majori indigent discursu, ignorari possunt
invincibiliter praesertim a plebe") [222]. For essentially the same divisions of natural
law precepts and ignorance thereof (but without mention of the plebs), see SUAREZ, De
Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 431-32, disp. 17, § 2, no. 7; SUAREZ, De Fide
II, supra note 30, at 139-42, disp. 3, question 3.
145. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 132-33, II, ch.
13, no. 2.
146. Id. at 134-35, nos. 6-10.
147. Id. at 135, ch. 14 ("Utrum jus naturale mutari vel dispensari potest per
humanam potestatem.") [265].
148. Id. at 137, no. 5 ("Nihilominus contraria opinio docetjus naturale in nullo
vero praecepto suo tolli, diminui, dispensari, aut alio simili modo posse mutari per
aliquam legem vel potestatem humanam. Haec est sine dubio sententia communis
theologorum ....")[268-69].
149. For discussion of the absolute and the ordained power of God up to Luther, see Richard P. Desharnais, The History of the Distinction between God's Absolute and Ordained Power and Its Influence on Martin Luther (1966) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America); see also Mary Ann Pernoud, The
Theory of the Potentia Dei According to Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham, in 47 ANTONIANUM 69
(1972).
150. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 144, II, ch. 15
("Utrum Deus dispensare possit in lege naturali etiam de absoluta potentia.") [285].
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In his answer some limits of Suirez's voluntarism become
evident. William of Ockham (1290-1349) and others, he
stated, have held that God could dispense with all the commands of the Decalogue.' 5 ' Indeed, these theorists believed
that God could abrogate the whole natural law. 15 2 Suirez and
other theologians dismissed this opinion as false and absurd. 5'
A different opinion is that of Duns Scotus (12661308) and his followers. They believed that while God could
not dispense with the precepts contained in the first table of
the Decalogue, He could dispense with the seven precepts in
the second table, which regard our fellow human beings or
other creatures. 54 Suirez rejected this,' 55 and ultimately
opted for an opinion that maintained that all the precepts 15of6
the Decalogue are indispensible, even by the power of God.
Infine, Suirez's "voluntarism" in no way equated with an absolutely arbitrary view of law in relation even to God.
5. TheJus Gentium More Specifically
As Sua'rez saw it, the "law of nations" or thejus gentium was
a quasi-medium between natural law and the positive law of
individual states. 57 Closely following upon the natural law,
thejus gentium was not as necessary as this latter. 58 In fact,
Suirez believed it had the character of positive law. 59 Yet its
151. Id. no. 3 ("Est ergo prima sententia generaliter affirmans posse Deum dispensare in omnibus praeceptis Decalogi.") [287].
152. Id. ("[q]uae consequenter ait non solum posse Deum dispensare, sed etiam
abrogare totam illam legem") [287]. For more about Ockham on law, see DAvrrr,
supra note 128, at 39-54.
153. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 144, II, ch. 15, no. 4

("[h]aec vero sententia tanquam falsa et absurda a reliquis theologis rejicitur") [287].
154. See id at 145, no. 6 ("Praecepta secundae tabulae dicuntur reliqua septem,
et in universum omnia quae circa proximos vel creaturas versantur, de quibus omni-

bus sentit Scotus dispensabilia esse.") [289]. For more on Duns Scotus on law, see
DAVIr, supra note 128, at 24-38.
155. SUaREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 146, II, ch. 15, no. 9

("mihi valde displicet haec sententia") [290].
156. Id. at 148, no. 16 ("Est... opinio, quae absolute et simpliciter docet, haec
praecepta Decalogi esse indispensabilia etiam per potentiam Dei absolutam.") [297];
id. at 149, no. 19 ("Haec igitur sententia formaliter, et proprie loquendo, vera est.")
[298].
157. Id. at 159, ch. 17, no. 1 ("quasi medium inter naturalejus, et humanum")
[325].
158. See id. at 162, ch. 17, no. 8.
159. Id. at 167, ch. 19, no. 3 ("Unde tandem concludi videturjus gentium simpliciter esse humanum ac positivum.") [343]; id. no. 4.
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precepts differed from those of civil law inasmuch as they were
unwritten and had been established by the customs not of a
single state or province but rather by those of all or almost all
nations.160 For just as custom established a law in one state or
province, so over the whole human race it could introduce the
"laws of nations."' t 6 1 In this way, like the state itself, the jus
gentium had its origin in human consensus.' 62 And while, like
16
insofar as it depended on
the state, it took a lot to change it,
human will in principle it could be changed. 164
In contrast to his fellow Jesuit, Gabriel Vizquez (15491604), Suirez viewed thejus gentium as not merely concessive,
but also prescriptive and proscriptive.1 65 It contained various
precepts and regulated a variety of matters among and within
different states. Su~irez never in any one passage listed these
precepts or the contents of thejus gentium. About as close as he
came was to give from the Etymologies of St. Isidore of Seville
(562(?)-636), the jumbled hodgepodge that was the common
medieval inheritance. 66 Isidore's list, which itself reflected the
traditions of Roman law,' 6 7 defies literal translation. It included (the rights) to take up residence or to occupy territory
(previously unoccupied), to build (dwellings), to defend (that
occupation and building) with fortifications, (to wage) wars, to
take prisoners (in those wars) as well as to make slaves (of
those prisoners). It further extended to peace treaties and armistices, the restoration of rights for those freed from captivity
of ambassa(that is, the Roman postliminia), the inviolability
68
miscegenation.
of
prohibition
a
dors, and
160. Id. at 168, no. 6 ("[p]raecepta juris gentium in hoc differunt a praeceptis
juris civilis, quia non scripto, sed moribus non unius vel alterius civitatis vel
provinciae, sed omnium vel fere omnium nationum, constat") [345].
161. Id. at 169, no. 9 ("Nam sicut in una civitate vel provincia consuetudo introducit jus, ita in universo humano genere potuerunt jura gentium moribus introduci.") [349].
162. Id. at 162, ch. 17, no. 8 ("praeceptajuris gentium ab hominibus introducta
sunt per arbitrium et consensum illorum, sive in tota hominum communitate sive in
majori parte") [332]; see id. at 182, III, ch. 2, no. 6.
163. See id. at 171-72, II, ch. 20, nos. 6-8.
164. Id. at 171, no. 6 ("colligitur jus gentium esse mutabile quatenus ex
hominum consensu pendet") [354]; see id. at 146, II, ch. 15, no. 10.
165. See id. at 163-66, ch. 18.
166. For Isidore's role in the development of the "law of nations," see RAMiREZ,
supra note 115, at 29-33.
167. See id.
168. See SAN ISIDORO DE SEVILLA, Etymologiae V, § 6, in I ETIMOLOGiAS 512 UJose
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As it stands, Isidore's cryptic list was not satisfactory for
Suarez. It needed nuancing in the way of what I have tried to
do in part by means of parentheses in the last paragraph.' 6 9 It
also needed pruning. Specifically, Suirez thought that some of
Isidore's items taken with rigor belonged more to natural
law. 170 For example, while no nation was required absolutely
by natural law to admit ambassadors from another, and while
the requirement of their admission was thus a matter ofjus gentium, once these were admitted under a somehow understood
pact (sub pacto subintellecto), their immunity became a matter of
natural law.' 7' Similarly, while treaties themselves were matters of the jus gentium, once they had been agreed upon their
required observance fell under natural law. 172 On the other
hand, items such as postliminia and strictures against miscegenation were much more matters of positive civil law than ofjus
gentium. 173
But even with nuancing, Sua'rez found Isidore's list to be
incomplete. Among topics it did not address and which Suarez
believed belonged in various ways to thejus gentium were: the
actual division of peoples and kingdoms themselves,1 74 the diOroz Reta et al. eds, bilingual ed. 1982) ("Jus gentium est sedium occupatio, aedificatio, munitio, bella, captivitates, servitutes, postliminia, foedera pacis, indutiae,
legatorum non violandorum religio, conubia inter alienigenas prohibita. Et inde jus
gentium, quia eojure omnes fere gentes utuntur.").

169. Suirez himself did some nuancing in SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA,
supra note 21, at 164-65, II, ch. 18, nos. 5-9.
170. Id. at 166, ch. 19, no. 1.
171. Id. at 168, no. 7. Suirez explained:
Nam consuetudo recipiendi legatos sub lege immunitatis et securitatis absolute spectata non est de necessitate juris naturalis, quia potuisset unaquaeque communitas hominum non habere apud se legatos alterius, nec
velle illos admittere: nunc tamen admittere est de jure gentium, et illos
repudiare esset signum inimicitiae, et esset violatio juris gentium, esto non
esset injustitia contra rationem naturalem. Quocirca, licet, supposita admissione legatorum sub pacto subintellecto, contra jus naturale sit non servare
illis immunitatem, quia est contrajustitiam et debitam fidelitatem: tamen illa
suppositio, et pactum illud sub tali conditionejure gentium est introductum.
Id. [346-47] It is worth emphasizing here that the requirement of admission under
thejs gentium would be for Suirez the basis of any Christian claims of injury against a
pagan nation that refuses to admit evangelists.
172. Id. at 169, no. 8.
173. Id. at 165-66, no. 10.
174. Id. at 164, ch. 18, no. 4 ("ipsamet gentium discretio et regnorum divisio est
dejure gentium") [336 N.3
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vision of goods or possessions, 7 5 private property, 176 buying
and selling,177 the use of money, 7 8 and free commerce among
nations. 179 Again, although the natural law required worship of
God and while positive law, both divine and human, prescribed
the details, there were religious matters that belonged to the
jus gentium. These were prescribed by neither natural nor positive law but were commonly found among almost all peoples.
Examples would be religious sacrifices and the existence of
priestly classes. 8 0
Connected immediately with its content, for Suirez the
"law of nations" or thejus gentium was twofold. In one way, it
was jus gentium inter se-a law that different nations maintain
and are obliged to observe vis-d-vis one another.' 8 ' Such items
as ambassadors and free commerce, as well as the "right of
war" (jus belli), belonged to thejus gentium understood in this
way. ' 2 In a second way, it wasjus gentium intra se-the law that
individual states and kingdoms commonly observe within
themselves.' 3 Most other items mentioned, including religious sacrifices and priestly classes, belonged to thejus gentium
taken in this second way. Is 4 The first way, which was effectively an international law, was most properly calledjus gentium
175. SUAREZ, De Cantate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 683, disp. 7, § 3,
no. 2 ("haec bona ex Dei institutione sunt communia: jure autem gentium sunt
divisa").
176. SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 210, III, ch. 2,

no. 14 ("Nam immediate non dedit Deus (ordinarie loquor) alicui homini proprium
et peculiare dominium alicujus rei...; privata autem dominia partim jure gentium,
partim jure civili introducta sunt ....
On this subject, see also Antonio Ferreiro
L6pez, La naturalezade la propiedadprivada en las doctrinas de Sudrez, in 4 PENSAMIENTO
449 (1948).
177. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 168, II, ch. 19, no.
7.
178. Id. at 170, no. 10.
179. Id. at 168, no. 7.
180. Id. at 169, no. 10. For basically the same division (without actual mention
of the jus gentium), see FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, Relectio de potestate Ecclesiae prior, in
OBRAS DE VITORIA, supra note 58, at 276, question 3, no. 3. On the natural character

of religion within political society, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
181. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 168, II, ch. 19, no. 8
("Addo ... duobus modis ... dici aliquid de jure gentium: uno modo quia est jus
quod omnes populi et gentes variae inter se servare debent .
) [347].
182. Id. at 169.
183. Id. ("alio modo quia estjus quod singulae civitates vel regna intra se observant") [347].
184. Id. at 169-70, no. 10.
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or "the law of nations."' 85 Sua'rez believed that it derived from
the natural law and, as such, was not abrogated by the Chris86
tian faith. 1
6. An Item ofJus Gentium-War
Like all other Catholic theologians of his day, Suirez did
not regard war as intrinsically evil or think it was in every instance prohibited for Christians. 18 7 On the contrary, although
he thought that war was deplorable and should be avoided
wherever possible,"" at times he found it necessary and the
89
only moral option open for the preservation of the republic.1
For any war to be just, Suirez believed certain conditions
had to be met. First, legitimate and supreme public authority
was required in order to declare a war. Second, a just cause or
claim of sufficient gravity was needed. And third, right conduct (debitus modus) was to be the rule in the beginning of the
war, in the prosecution of the war, and in the victory afterwards. 190
Justification for war could be offered under thejus gentium,
insofar as any republic or state had a right and even an obligation to defend itself.' 9 ' As we shall see, Suirez thought this
185. Id. at 169 ("prior modus videtur mihi proprissime continerejus gentium re
ipsa a distinctum ajure civili") [347]. On the originality of Suirez here and its subsequent importance for modern international law, see ROMMEN, supra note 67, at 458.
186. SUAREZ, Defensiofdei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 219, III, ch. 4,
no. 7 ("hoc etiam est de jure gentium a naturali derivatum, quod fides non tollit").
For the thought that faith and the order of grace do not destroy nature, see SUAREZ,
De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 435, disp. 25, § 4, no. 5; SUAREZ, De
Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 748, disp. 13, § 5, no. 6.
187. SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 737, disp. 13, § 1,
no. 2 ("bellum simpliciter nec est intrinsece malum, nec Christianis prohibitum")
[800].
188. Id. at 738 no. 3; id. at 743, § 4, no. 1; see infra note 193 and accompanying
text.
189. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 164, II, ch. 18,
no. 5; SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 738, disp. 13, § 1,
nos. 4-5.
190. SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 737, disp. 13, § 1,
no. 7 ("ut helium honeste fiat, nonnullae conditiones sunt observandae, quae ad tria
capita revocantur. Primum, ut sit a legitima potestate. Secundum, utjusta causa, et
titulus. Tertium, ut servetur debitus modus, et aequalitas in illius initio, prosecu-

tione, et victoria .... ") [805]. Suirez developed these conditions in sections 2
through 8 of disputation 13 of De Caritate. See id. at 739-59.
191. Id. at 738 no. 4 ("Dico secundo: bellum defensivum non solum est licitum,
sed interdum etiam praeceptum.") [802].
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right would also extend to the defense of innocent persons.
But in addition, under thejus gentium, war could be sanctioned
as a matter of vindictive justice.' 92 That is to say it might be
allowed as based upon one state's power or authority to pun93
ish, avenge, or repay an injury done to it by another.'
Let us note this. The power involved here is not, as Vitoria earlier said, "by the authority of the whole world."' 94 Despite what we have seen Sua'rez say about the unity of the
human race as foundation for thejus gentium, he was not thinking of any international political authority, much less any definite arrangement along the lines of a United Nations or a
World Court. Each state, "supreme in its own order"-here
the temporal order-with no tribunal beyond, had the author95
ity forcibly to redress injuries against itself.'
Nevertheless, that such authority be in an injured republic
was not absolutely necessary. As Suirez saw it, human beings
could have chosen another way of vindication or they could
even have entrusted that authority to a third prince as a quasiarbiter with coercive power.' 9 6 But because the current prac192. Id. at 744, § 4, no. 5. For Suirez's views on vindictive justice, see SUAREZ,
DE JUSTMA ETJURE, supra note 52, at 107-09, disp. 4, question 4; see also SUAREZ, De
JustitiaDei, in 11 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 569-77, § 5.
193. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 169, II, ch. 19, no. 8
("quatenus fundatur in potestate quam una respublica vel monarchia suprema habet
ad puniendam vel vindicandam, aut reparandam injuriam sibi ab altera illatam,
videtur proprie esse de jure gentium") [348]; see SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 743, disp. 13, § 4, no. 1 ("Rursus causa haec justa et sufficiens est gravis injuria illata, quae alia ratione vindicari aut reparari nequit.") [816];
SUAREZ, DejustitiaDei, in 11 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 572, § 4, no. 7.
194. See Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio dejure belli, in 6 CORPus HISPANORUM DE
PACE, supra note 4, at 136, IV, § 1, ch. 5 ("principes non solum habent auctoritatem
in suos, sed etiam in extraneos ad coercendum illos, ut abstineant se ab iniuriis; et
hoc jure gentium et orbis totius auctoritate").
195. SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 744, disp. 13, § 4,
no. 5 ("in orbe, ut diversae respublicae pacate vivant, necessaria est potestas
puniendi injurias unius contra aliam. Haec autem potestas non est in aliquo superiore, quia nullum habent.... ergo necesse est, ut sit in supremo principe reipublicae
laesae, cui alius subdatur ratione delicti." [818] Not far from this is a thought on
world government in a slightly different context. See SUAREZ, De Fide III, supra note
30, at 192, disp. 6, question 1 ("Respondetur ad primum in unaquaque gente et
republica earn potestatem esse apud supremum principem illius, quodsi ille male se
gerat, reipublicae habent potestatem in ilium; si tamen omnes in malo consentiant,
vindicta remittenda est Deo, qui est vindex in omnibus . . . neque enim potuit
humano modo commodius universus mundus gubernari.") On the difference here
between Suirez and Vitoria, see OBRAs DE VITORIA, supra note 58, at 764-68.
196. See generally SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 169, 11,
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tice of one state having the power to avenge itself by war upon
another was "more manageable and more consistent with nature," it was accepted as just and the power of the injured state
97
could not be resisted without violating thejus gentium.
A special situation existed among Christian nations and
their rulers inasmuch as the Pope, exercising his indirect
power in the temporal order, could intervene in their disputes.' 98 More than that, he could decide these disputes in
such a way that, absent any patent injustice, the contending
parties would be obliged to accept his decision.' 9 9 For this
reason, Vitoria's friend and successor, Domingo de Soto, O.P.,
(1495-1560) had thought that among Christian princes just
wars were rare.2"' Even so, said Suirez, the Pope did not always intervene, and Christian rulers were not obliged to press
him to do so. 2 0 ' Moreover, in the absence of papal intervention, a ruler or a republic that had suffered an injury had a
22
right under the jus gentium to look to itself for satisfaction. 1
ch. 19, n.8 ("potuissent enim homines instituere alium modum vindictae, vel committere illam potestatem alicui tertio principi, et quasi arbitrio cum potestate coactiva")
[348].
197. See id. ("tamen quia hic modus, qui nunc servatur, facilior est, magisque
naturae consentaneus, usu introductus est, et itajustus, ut non possit illijure resisti")
[348].
198. See Suirez, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMINA, supra note 21, at 740, disp. 13,
§ 2, no. 5; see also SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 313, III,
ch. 22, no. 14.
199. See SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 740, disp. 13,

§ 2, no. 5 ("[Supremus Pontifex] habetjus avocandi sibi causam belli, et potestatem
ferendi sententiam, cui partes tenentur obedire, nisi manifestam faciat injustitiam.")
[808].
200. See id. ("quapropter Soto, ad Rom. 12, dixit raro inter principes christianos
esse bellum justum, quia aliam viam expeditam habere possunt ad terminandas
causas communes") [809].
201. Id.
202. Id ("quamdiu non prohibentur, possuntjus suum prosequi") [809]. Suirez
said it is self-evident that injury makes a debtor of the one who causes it. See SUAREZ,
Dejsttitia Dei, in 11 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 571, § 5, no. 6 ("per injuriam vero
constituitur debtor is qui facit, non qui recipit, ut est per se notum"). Along with
this, a state or prince that perpetrates an injury is subject only to the one who receives it. Thus each may pursue the vindication of injury to itself but no one is empowered to police the world. See SUAREZ, De Cantate, in 12 OPERA

OMNIA,

supra note

21, at 744, disp. 13, § 4, no. 3. ("is qui facit injuriam sit factus subditus, sed tantum
offenso. Unde, quod quidam aiunt, supremos reges habere potestatem ad vindicandas injurias totius orbis, est omnino falsum, et confundit omnem ordinem, et distinctionem jurisdictionum: talis enim potestas, neque a Deo data est, neque ex ratione colligitur.") [817].
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This last would seem a fortiori to be true in the case of war
between non-Christian states, or between a Christian republic
and one that is non-Christian, inasmuch as the indirect temporal power of a Pope presupposes his direct spiritual power.20 3
As was noted above,2 °4 civil power, precisely as such,
would not be greater in Christian princes than in pagan
princes. The immediate corollary from this is that Christian
princes could have no more reason for a just war than other
princes could have. 2 5 All persons could defend themselves.
All persons could avenge injury or defend the innocent. But
Christian states and Christian sovereigns could not claim any
further rights beyond this.20 6 Specifically, they could not make
claim to war against unbelievers solely because they chose not
20 7
to follow Christianity.
IV. THE DIVISION(S) OF UNBELIEVERS
Looking through Suirez's volumes, I have found different,
but not mutually contradictory, divisions of unbelievers. The
order in which I will now present these divisions is atemporal.
If that serves to emphasize his two treatises "On Faith," so
much the better.
A. The De Baptismo-1595
First, in his treatise "On Baptism," published at Salamanca in 1595, Sufirez divided unbelievers into "apostates"
and "non-apostates." The former would be all those who having been baptised as Catholic Christians had left the Church.
Suirez believed that all of these, whether they had since become heretics, Jews, or pagans, remained subject to the direct
spiritual jurisdiction of the Church. This subjection would extend, he thought, even to the right of the Church to baptize
203. See SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 747, disp. 13,
§ 5, no. 4.
204. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
205. See SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 748, disp. 13,
§ 5, no. 6 ("Dicendum est ergo nullum esse titulum belli ita proprium christianorum
principum, qui non habeat fundamentum aliquod, vel certe proportionem cum lege
naturali, atque adeo qui suo modo non etiam conveniat principibus infidelibus ......
[826].
206. Id. ("quod ut explicem, dico primo: christianus princeps non potest indicere bellum, nisi vel ratione injuriae, vel ob defensionem innocentium") [826].
207. See id. at 746, § 5, no. 1.
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their infants whether they themselves agreed or not. "Nonapostate unbelievers" would be those who had never been
baptised-including Jews, Saracens, and pagans generally.
These were not directly subject to the Church and, as we remarked above,2 °8 Christian rulers (as well as the Church itself)
had no right to forcibly baptize them or their children. Without prejudice to this, a subdivision was in order with respect to
these non-apostate unbelievers. Some of them were in fact
subject to the temporal power of Christian rulers. Others were
in no way subject, either spiritually or temporally.2 °9
B. The Defensio Fidei--1613
Jumping to 1613, Suirez, in one place within the context
of the Defensio Fidei, divided unbelievers into three groups.
Some were subject, directly or indirectly, to the Church only in
temporal matters. Examples, he believed, were the Jews (or
the Muslims) who commonly lived in Christian lands. Others
were subject to the Church spiritually, including baptized heretics and apostates. Third were those who were not subject in
any way, either temporally or spiritually. These presumably
would be all non-baptized persons living in territories outside
Christian jurisdiction.2 10
C. The First Lectures De Fide-1583
Going back to the 1583 lectures "On Faith," we encounter
two threefold divisions of "unbelief." The first is into Judaism,
paganism, and heresy. 2 '' The second occurs within a discussion of evangelization, or more specifically, within a discussion
of the sin of infidelity and the possibility of excusing ignorance. 2 12 There were those who had never heard of the Christian faith. There were those who had heard it but not well
enough. And then, there were those who had heard it well
208. See SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, III, § 3 ("The
Limitations of State Power").
209. See SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 428, disp. 25,
§ 3, no. 1.
210. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 219, III, ch.
4, no. 8.
211. See Suirez, De Fide H, supra note 30, at 150-51, disp. 4, question 1.
212. See id. at 127, disp. 3, question 2 ("Quaestio secunda: Utrum haec ignorantia vel error possit interdum excusari a peccato infidelitatis.").
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enough and who despite this remained in their unbelief.2 ..
From a text immediately following this division, it appears
that in 1583 Sua'rez regarded the American Indians as generally belonging to the second class-at least during the first decades of the Spanish conquest of the New World. This earlier
mentioned text, which contains Suirez's single unambiguous
reference to the American Indians, concerns the reason that,
despite hearing about the Christian faith, the Indians might
have remained invincibly ignorant of it. It reads as follows:
if the Faith is proclaimed not in a pious and Christian waybut rather tyrannically and cruelly as was done in the beginning by the Spaniards among the Indians-this is not
enough to remove invincible ignorance of that Faith. For
on account of [such tyranny and cruelty], people like these
[Indians] cannot and should not consider that Faith to be
holy and religious and pertaining to the true God.214
We have, of course, no way of interpreting this "beginning" of which Sufirez speaks. Most likely it would extend
from 1492 at least up until Vitoria's lectures in 1539. In this
way, it would encompass the excesses of the earlier Conquistadors, for example, Cortes in Mexico, and Pizarro in Peru. Possibly, it could extend a little later to the famous "New Laws" of
1542-1543.25 If we restrict the relevant period to a date
before 1539, it would be difficult to account for the apparent
currency of Vitoria's remarks at that time. But if we advance it'
much beyond 1543, it is difficult to think of a "beginning" and
still leave room for a middle and end of the time between 1492
and Suirez's lectures in 1583. But admittedly this is speculation. What is certain is that, in the one reference he made to
213. Id. at 129 ("Distinguendi ergo sunt tres status hominum: quidam sunt, qui
nunquam audierunt fidem, quidam audierunt sed non sufficienter, quidam vero sufficienter.").
214. d. at 131 ("si fides non annuntietur pio et christiano modo, sed tyrannice
etcrudeliter, ut in principio ab Hispanis apud Indos factum est, non sufficit illud ad
tollendam ignorantiam invincibilem fidei, quia non potest ea de causa talis gens nec
debet illam fidem concipere ut piam et religiosam et ad verum Deum pertinentem").
215. For these, see Las Nuevas Leyes de 1542-1543. Ordenanzas para lagobernacidn
de las Indias y buen tratamiento y conservacidn de los indios. (Edici6n, estudio y notas por
contra insulanos: intervenAntonio Muro Orej6n, 1941); see also Juan de la Pefia, De bello
cidn de EspaTa en America: Escuela Espafiola de la Paz, segunda generacidn, 1560-1585, ed.
por Luciano Perefia, et al., 2 vols., in 9 CoRPus HISPANORUM DE PACE, supra note 4,
33-38 (1982); 10 CoRPus HISPANORUM DE PACE, 102-27 (1982).
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the Spaniards spreading the Gospel in the New World, Suirez
is bluntly and harshly critical. What is problematic is his attitude regarding New World activities in his own time and in the
decades immediately preceding. Again, what remains a mystery is his silence on that score after 1583.
D. The De Fide Published by Alvarez-1621
Two divisions occur in the De Fide text published by Alvarez. The first division is a general split of "infidelity" or unbelief into three types: paganism (including Islam), Judaism, and
heresy.2" 6 Suairez allowed a possible coupling of all three types
with apostasy, here meaning the deliberate abandonment of
once accepted Christian belief.21 7 The second division related
to non-apostate unbelievers. These were divided in a manner
similar to that of 1583, into: (1) those who understood the
Christian faith sufficiently but still did not accept it; (2) those
who had never heard anything about it, and (3) those in the
21 8
middle, who had not heard enough about it.
Interesting in the second group within this division is the
composition of its members. The actual composition was formerly a matter of controversy among theologians. Reading the
Scripture literally, St. John Chrysostom and others had believed that at the time of St. Pau 2 ' 9 the Gospel had been
preached all over the world. However, said Sufirez, "today it is
known from experience that there were, and still are, many
provinces and kingdoms of the world to which neither the
preaching nor the news of the Gospel had come. ' 22 0 But even
if one were to grant that the Gospel was preached by the Apostles in all parts of the world, Suirez believed one could still say
that it had not been sufficiently proposed to all individual persons. 22 ' According to Suairez, "this was true not only at the
216. See

SUAREZ, De Fide, in

12

OPERA OMNIA, supra

note 21, at 415, XVI, § 4, no.

3.
217. Id. at 417, no. 9; see id. at 420, § 5, no. 1.

218. Id. at 425, disp. 17, § 1, no. 6.
219. See Romans 10:18.
220. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 425, disp. 17, § 1,
no. 6 ("Quin etiam hodie experimento cognitum est, multas fuisse et nunc esse

provincias, et regna orbis, ad quae nec praedicatio nec fama Evangelii pervenerat.")
For St. John Chrysostom, see Commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanos, Homilia XVIII, in
60 Patrologia, Series Graeca col. 574 (J.P. Migne, ed., 1859).
221. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 428 no. 13.
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time of the Apostles but also, as is known from experience, in
all time following up to the present.' '222 The second group in
the division could include the lands and peoples of the New
World.
This impression is strengthened when we look at the third
group, those in the middle, who have heard some but not
enough about the Christian faith. For when Suirez listed some
of those in this category, in contrast to his 1583 lectures, he
did not include the American Indians. Instead, he spoke of
persons living "among the Turks or the Saracens or in the
provinces of India when the Faith began to be preached
there.

' 223

From this one thing should be emphasized and another
may be fairly inferred. First, in the 1613 revision of his lectures Suirez dropped explicit reference to the Indians of the
New World. And second, teaching in 1613 at Coimbra in Portugal, he seemed inclined to take his cues not so much from
Spain in the New World as from the experience of the Portuguese in India and parts east. But let us now pass to our principal source, Disputation 18 of the Coimbra De Fide text.
V. SUAREZ ON PREACHING THE GOSPEL TO
NON-APOSTATE UNBELIEVERS
Although there may be some question about where Suirez
would ultimately locate the American Indians, when the
Spaniards encountered them, of course, they were unbelievers
and, just as obviously, they were not apostates. As such, they
appeared to be immediately, even if not expressly, the concern
of the questions raised in Disputation 18. The first five of
these questions are of particular interest for us. Let us then
follow them in order.
A. Does the Church Have the Power and the Right to Preach the
224
Gospel Everywhere to All Unbelievers?
Sufrez says that there are two words in this question222. Id. ("quod non solum est verum de tempore Apostolorum, sed etiam de
toto posteriori tempore usque ad praesens, ut experimento etiam cognitum est").
223. Id. at 425, no. 6 ("inter Turcas et Saracenos, et in provinciis Indiae, quando
in eis coepit praedicari fides").
224. Id. at 436, disp. 18, § 1 ("Utrum Ecclesia habeat potestatem et jus
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"power" (potestas) and "right" (jus)-that do not mean the
same thing. First, one could have power (potestas) to do something: when one is allowed to do that thing even though one
does not have an explicit right (jus), or dominion (dominium),
to do so. For example, I may be allowed to enter another's
house. In a second way, power could exist together with a
right (jus), for example, the power of using my own house or
225
using something common to all.
As Suirez saw it, in this case the Church had not only a
simple "permissive" empowerment (facultatem). It also has a
right with a special power (jus cum speciali potestate) to preach
the Gospel everywhere. The basis for this was that Christ had
such a right over all men as his very inheritance and-because
He was by himself not about to teach all men-He communicated that right to his Apostles and then through his Apostles
He gave it to His Church. 22 6 All of this, Suirez thought, was
inferred from both the Old and New Testament. For in the
Psalms, in the person of Christ it was said: "By him I have been
appointed King over Sion, his holy mountain," and the way he
would obtain the kingdom was indicated by the addition:
"preaching his commandment. ' 22 7 Then the same Psalm further added: "Ask of me, and I will give you the nations for
your inheritance and the ends of the earth for your possession. "228 The fulfillment of this in and through Christ, Sufirez
thought, was attested to in the Gospel of Matthew-"All power
has been given to me in heaven and on earth, ' 22 9 and "Going
therefore teach all nations. '23 0 In line with this, said Suairez,
praedicandi Evangelium omnibus infidelibus ubique." [739]); see Suirez, De Fide H,
supra note 30, at 216, disp. 5, question 4.
225. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 436, disp. 18, § 1,

no. 1. To this I add that generally, but not always, Suirez and other scholastics contrasted potestas as power in the sense of right, jurisdiction, or authority with potentia as
power in the sense of physical force.
226. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OMNIA OPERA, supra note 21, at 437, disp. 18, § 1, no.
2 ("Fundamentum est, quia Christus Dominus habuit hocjus in universos homines in
haereditatem suam, quam mediante praedicatione fidei erat acquisiturus, et quia non
erat per se ipsum docturus omnes gentes, illam potestatem cum jure et auctoritate
suis Apostolis, et per eos Ecclesiae communicavit;...") [741].
227. See Psalms 2:6.
228. Id.at 8.
229. Matthew 28:18.
230. Id.at 19.
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St. Paul could write: "We are ambassadors for Christ.'1 But
an ambassador represents his prince and shares in His power.
Hence, the Church has a special right to spread the Gospel.
But, more than this, it had a necessary obligation as well. For
Christ Himself commanded: "Go into the whole world and
preach the Gospel to every creature, "232 and St. Paul exclaimed: "Woe to me if I preach not the Gospel, for a neces-

sity lies upon me. "233

Moreover, although such a special power could not be
proven by natural reason, it was, Sua'rez thought, quite consistent with natural reason because, the right to teach the ignorant was, as it were, connatural to every man. Thus, if one supposed, as Sufrez did, the necessity of Christian faith for salvation,23 4 it is very much in line with natural reason, that the
author of that faith would have left to his ministers, especially

to the Pope, a special right to teach men the Gospel truth. 3
Immediately ensuing from this, Suirez asserted that the
Church had the right to protect its preachers and to punish
those who through physical power or force impeded their
preaching.23 6 If the Church had the right to preach everywhere, those who by physical power impeded the exercise of
that right did injury (in the physical or temporal order) to the

Church. Therefore, the Church could repulse that power and
defend its right. 23 7 This reasoning, he thought, was strengthened by a principle of both civil and canon law: A grant of
231. See 2 Corinthians 5:20.
232. Mark 16:15; see Matthew 28:19; see also SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA,
supra note 21, at 357, disp. 12, § 4, no. 18; id. at 360, no. 25.
233. 1 Corinthians9:16; see SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at
437, disp. 18, § 1, no. 2; see also SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note
21, at 429, disp. 25, § 3, no. 1; SUAREZ, DeLegibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21,
at 190, III, ch. 6, no. 1.
234. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 340, disp. 12, § 2, no.
5 ("Nihilominus dicendum primo, actum fidei ita esse necessarium ad salutem omni
adulto, ut nullus omnino in ullo tempore, loco, vel occasione sine illojustificari potuerit; itaque ab hac regula nulla admittenda exceptio.") [742]; id. at 355-56, § 4, no.
14.
235. See id. at 438, disp. 18, § 1, no. 3 ("jus docendi ignorantes est quasi connaturale cuicumque homini; ergo, supposita necessitate fidei, est valde consentaneum rationi, quod auctor fidei suis ministris, et praesertim Vicario suo relinqueret speciale jus ad illuminando homines in doctrina fidei") [743].
236. Id. no. 4.
237. Id. ("si Ecclesia habet jus praedicandi ubique Evangelium, qui per vim et
potentiam usum illius juris impedit, injuriam facit Ecclesiae; ergo potest Ecclesia il-
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jurisdiction brings with it all that is morally necessary for its
exercise. 23 8 A "third and best reason" was taken from the belief that, under thejus gentium, each republic was empowered to
defend innocent persons who may be suffering grave injury from
those more physically powerful than themselves. But for
Suirez, those who impeded the preaching of the Gospel were

inflicting a most serious harm upon many persons, who perhaps
would be converted if they heard it and who would willingly
hear it if it were preached. Therefore, the Church (which he
termed a "spiritual republic") was indirectly empowered to defend such persons, who in this case would be innocent and
would be suffering serious injury. 23 9 This, he thought, was rea-

sonable inasmuch as every republic had the right, under thejus
gentium, to send ambassadors of peace to another republic and
had consequently the authority to defend them, and to avenge

injury, if they were mistreated. Therefore, Sua'rez believed,
much more did the Church have this right with regard to its

ambassadors, who were the preachers of the Christian faith.
This was especially so, he thought, inasmuch as Christ empow-

ered the Church to increase and to expand over the whole
world.2 4 °
lam propulsare, et jus suum tueri") [743]. Note potentia as power in the sense of
physical force.
238. Id. ("declaratur amplius haec ratio ex alio principio utriusque juris, quod,
concessa jurisdictione, conceduntur omnia quae ad exercitium ejus moraliter necessaria sunt, quia alias concessio diminuta esset et ineflicax") [743].
239. Id. Suirez explained:
Tertia ratio est optima de quadam potestate quasi naturali, licet indirecta:
nam unaquaeque respublica habet potestatem defendendi innocentes, qui
gravem a potentioribus patiuntur injuriam; sed qui impediunt Evangelii
praedicationem, gravissimum nocumentum inferunt multis, qui fortasse
converterentur, si illud audissent, et libenter audirent, si praedicatum fuisset; ergo habet Ecclesia potestatem defendendi illos qui in ea parte innocentes sunt, et injuriam gravem patiuntur.
Id. [743] For Suirez's views on the right to defend the innocent, see SUAREZ, De
Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 748, disp. 13, § 5, no. 7; see also SUAREZ,
De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 429, disp. 25, § 3, no. 1. For
Suirez's views on the Church as a "spiritual republic," see SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12
OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 245, disp. 9, § 1,no. 3; SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24
OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 231, III, ch. 6, no. 2; id. at 244, ch. 8, no. 4; see also
SUAREZ, De Censuris, in 23 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 5, disp. 1, § 2, no. 5; id. at 8,
no. 15.
240. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 438, disp. 18, § 1, no.
4. Sufirez stated that
unaquaeque respublica habet jus mittendi legatos pacis ad aliam rempubli-
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For Suirez, the supreme and universal empowerment for
sending preachers was in the Supreme Pontiff, because he
alone was the supreme pastor of the entire Church of Christ
and had the principal task of propagating the Church and
spreading the Christian faith. 4 ' Accordingly, the right of protecting (jus tutandi) those preachers, if necessary by means of

war and physical force, belonged to the Pope.24 2 The reasoning was that the Pope had the prerogative to defend the universal rights of the Church. This is because such defense, even
by means of war if necessary, required the kind of supreme
authority needed for war. But this kind of authority did not
belong in this instance to temporal sovereigns. Rather, in this
case it flowed from a spiritual right, the very right to send
preachers, that is not granted to temporal sovereigns. As such,
the right to protect its preachers was joined with the Church's
spiritual power, which then extended indirectly to temporal
things.2 43
It must be added that, for Suirez, this right did not belong
to the Pope in such fashion that he could exercise it through
clerics.2 4 4 Instead, he was empowered to commit this defense
cam, et consequenter habet potestatem defendendi illos, et vindicandi injuriam, si male tractentur; ergo multo magis habet Ecclesia hoc jus circa
legatos suos, qui sunt fidei praedicatores, praesertim cum habeat Ecclesia
potestatem a Christo datam, crescendi et occupandi totum orbem ut supra
probatum est.
Id. [743] As we have seen, supra note 171 and accompanying text, no nation was
required by natural law to admit legates. The requirement, and perhaps strictly
speaking the correlative right to send legates, was a matter ofjus gentium.
241. See SUAREZ, De Fide, supra note 21, at 439, disp. 18, § 1, no. 6. In this connection, at one point Suirez mentioned the "New World" (novus orbis) coupled with
"The India of the East" (Orientis India) as places for which the Pope has appointed
bishops. See id. at 301, disp. 10, § 2, no. 23.
242. Id. at 439, no. 7 ("multo majori ratione dicendum est munus illud
defendendi hocjus etiam per coactionem et bellum, si fuerit necessarium, solius esse
Summi Pontificis") [746].
243. Id. Suirez stated that
tum quia ad ilium pertinet universalia jura Ecclesiae defendere; tum etiam
quia haec defensio per bellum requirit, per se loquendo, quamdam
supremam potestatem; haec autem potestas non convenit per principibus
temporalibus, quia ex jure manat spirituali, quod non est principibus
temporalibus concessum, sed conjunctum est cum potestate spirituali, quae
indirecte extenditur ad temporalia.
Id. [746).
244. See id.; see also SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 741 43, disp. 13, § 3 ("Utrum indicere et exequi bellum liceat etiam clericis") [810].
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of preachers to temporal sovereigns, whom he may even command to assume the task. Hence, also, as Major and Vitoria
both have rightly noted:
the Pope can distribute the provinces and kingdoms of infidels among temporal princes and kings, not that they may
occupy them arbitrarily-for that would amount to tyranny
... but that they would procure preachers of the Gospel to
be sent to those infidels and that they would protect those
preachers by their power, even by declaring just war, if reason and a just cause demand it. And in this regard, the
Pope can pre-fix for each prince certain boundaries, which
afterwards may not be crossed without injustice, as we read
was done by Alexander VI between the kings of Portugal
and Castille.2 4 5
Although Suirez in this place still did not name the American Indians, the reference to Pope Alexander's May 4, 1493
Bull, Inter coetera,2 46 brings them and the New World clearly
within the purview of the question here in the De Fide. Further,
it gives insight into Suirez's interpretation of what the Pope
did and what that tells us about papal power.
Like Vitoria before, Sufirez did not regard the Pope as
ruler of the world. The Pope could not, therefore, simply hand
lands and peoples over to the jurisdiction of whomever he
pleased. But he was charged with protecting the interests of
245. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 439, disp. 18, § 1, no.
7. The original reads
potest Pontifex inter principes seu reges temporales distribuere provincias,
et regna infidelium, non ut illas suo arbitrio occupare possint, hoc enim
sed ut praedicatores Evangelii ad illos mittendos
tyrannicum esset ....
procurent, et sua potestate illos tueantur, etiamjustum bellum indicendo, si
ratio et justa causa postulet. Et quoad hoc potest Pontifex unicuique
principi certos terminos praefigere, quos postea sine injustitia transgredi
non poterit, sicut factum esse legimus ab Alexandro VI inter reges
Lusitaniae et Castellae.
Id. [746]; see SUAREZ, De Fide II, supra note 30, at 218-19, disp. 5, question 4.
246. See 5 BULLARUM DIPLOMATUM ET PRIVILEGIORUM SANCTORUM ROMANORUM
PONTIFIcIUM 361-64 (Augustanae Taurinorum ed., 1860) [hereinafter BULLARUM
DIPLOMATUM]. For an English translation, see 1JOHN H. PARRY & ROBERT G. KEITH,
NEW IBERIAN WORLD: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT
OF LATIN AMERICA TO THE EARLY 17TH CENTURY 271-74 (1984). For the provenance

(or perhaps better the "Herkunfi") of Inter coetera (which was not actually signed by
Alexander himself), see Joseph H6ffner, KOLONIALISMUS UND EVANGELIUM:
SPANISCHE KOLONIALETHIK IM GOLDENEN ZEITALTER, IN VERBESSERTE AUFLAGE 210-12
(1969).
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the Church, which at times would require him to step into the
temporal sphere. Thus, in the case of Alexander VI, the division of the world was for the purpose of procuring and protecting missionaries. The overall reason was to insure that this
most serious matter of spreading the Gospel be carried out in
an orderly way, in a way that would keep peace among the
Christian sovereigns themselves, and also help each of them to
take better care of those unbelievers (genti) committed to
him.247 Hence, said Suirez, in this matter the Pope was like a
principal mover and kings were "like his tools or instruments"
(veluti organa et instrumenta ejus). Accordingly, none of these
kings could transgress the boundaries prescribed for them. 48
The question now was whether this defense of preachers
of the Gospel was permissible only after an injury had been
inflicted or some obstacle had been placed in the way of their
preaching. Or, variantly, was it permitted by way of "anticipated security" so to speak-by sending soldiers beforehand,
done to the preachers or lest their ministry be
lest injury be
9
2

impeded.

4

Some had said that a Christian prince could with justice
occupy the kingdom of a pagan (gentilis) prince simply in order
that under Christian rule the Gospel could be preached there
more successfully and securely. 250 But because this was on its
face incredible, others, like Major, had moderated it by saying
247. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 439-40, disp. 18,
§ 1, no. 7 ("Et ratio omnium est, quia ita expedit ut haec res, quae in Ecclesia gravissima est, ordinate fiat, quod maxime est necessarium, turn ad conservandam pacem
inter ipsos christianos principes, turn etiam ut unusquisque majori sollicitudine
procuret bonum genti sibi commissae.") [746-47]. For Suirez's denial of a universal
temporal power on the part of the Pope and for the statement that the only power
and right the Church has with regard to non-apostate infidels is the right to preach
the Gospel, see SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 192, III, ch. 6,
no. 1; see also SUAREZ, De Cantate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 747, disp. 13,
§ 5, no. 4.
248. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 440, disp. 18, § 1,

no. 7.
249. Id. no. 8 ("an haec defensio praedicationis, seu praedicatorum Evangelii,
solum liceat post irrogatam injuriam ab infidelibus, seu impedimentum praedicationi
fidei positum, aut etiam liceat per anticipatam securitatem (ut sic dicam),
praeveniendo per milites ne injuria fiat praedicatoribus, vel ne ministerium eorum
impediatur") [747].
250. Id. ("Aliqui enim dixerunt posse principem christianumjuste occupare regnum principis gentilis, solum hoc titulo, ut sub principe christiano majori commoditate et securitate ibi Evangelium praedicetur .... ") [747].

920 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 15:879

that Christian princes could send preachers with a sufficient
army, not to wage war but in order to secure safe entry for
those preachers. They also allowed that a Christian prince
could build strongpoints and fortresses in the territories of unbelievers, at least at the borders of their provinces, so that entry to those unbelievers could be more easy and more secure.
Then finally, they said that princes could exact from nonbelieving kingdoms the expenses which they incurred in these matters, because such had been incurred for those unbelievers' advantage. Consequently, if they were denied, they could extort
these expenses by force and war, which they could pursue up
to the occupation of the kingdom, if that were necessary. 2 5 '
Sufirez agreed with Vitoria and others that the overall doctrine here should not be accepted. First, he found it to have no
basis in the teachings of Christ. Indeed, Christ said: "Behold,
I am sending you like sheep among wolves" 2 5 2 -by which
words He plainly showed that the word of faith could not be
introduced by force of arms, but by meekness and patience, by
efficacy of word, and by example of life, according to St. Paul's
sentence: "The weapons of our army are not carnal, but the
power of God."'253 Second, it was against the customary prac251. Id. Sufirez's exact words were:
[S]ed quia hoc per se incredibile est, ut ex dicendis patebit, alii
id moderati
sunt, dicentes posse principes christianos mittere praedicatores cum sufficienti exercitu, non ut bellum inferant, sed ut praedicatores securi incedant. Addunt praeterea posse christianum principem aedificare turres et
arces munitas in terris infidelium, saltem in terminis provinciarum, ut introitus et ingressus [sic] ad infideles sit facilior et securior fidelibus.
Denique dicunt posse principes, expensas quas in his rebus fecerint, a regnis
infidelibus exigere, quia in eorum commodum expenduntur, et consequenter posse per vim et bellum extorquere, si negentur, atque ita
procedere usque ad occupationem regni, si oportuerit. Ita sentit Major, in
secundo, distinctione quadragesima quarta, quaestione secunda; et solum
fundatur in majori favore fidei.
Id. [747] For Major's view, see MAJOR, supra note 59, disp. 44, question 3
("[r]espondetur cum linguam hyspanicam non intellexerunt nec concionatores verbi
divini sine magno milite admitterent necesse erat arces munitas hic et illic exstruere,
ut successu temporum effrenis populus ad mores christianorum assuesceretur"); see
HOFFNER, supra note 240, at 336, no. 51. For some idea of the expenses incurred
from Spanish efforts to evangelize the New World, see generally Ricardo Garcia-Villoslada, Felipe Hy lacontrarreformacatdlica, in3 HISTORIA DE LA IGLESIA EN ESPA&A 101-

02 (2d ed. 1980).
252. Matthew 10:16; see Luke 10:3.
253. 2 Corinthians 10; see SUAREz, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at
440, disp. 18, § 1, no. 9. For other references to this text, see id. at 121, disp. 4, § 3,
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tice of the Church-as for example, even after the conversion
of Constantine, when254 Pope Gregory I sent unprotected
preachers to England.
Third, to Suirez this was not defense but rather an aggression. It was a virtual coercion to the Christian faith, or at least
to hearing the faith. Indeed if preachers were sent with an
army, those to whom they were sent, ordinarily and with obvious reason, would presume that these preachers were being
sent more for occupying their territory than for taking care of
their spiritual salvation. Reasonably, therefore, they could
have cause for a just war against such preachers and their accompanying army. And if some were unable to resist and they
allowed it from fear, that in itself would be maximum coercion.
Moreover, in Sufirez's view this was hardly a fit way to introduce the faith. To be sure, he said, it could lead to its injury
and infamy, inasmuch as unbelievers would think that the faith
sanctioned the violation of theJus gentium, and even of the natural law, by occupying foreign lands, against the will of their
rulers, and by waging war without a just title. As a result, they
could also become obdurate and more indisposed to accept
2 55
that faith.
(In contrast to his thoughts here in 1614, for the exposition of which he devoted almost a whole page, in 1583 Suirez
no. 4; id. at 446, disp. 18, § 3, no. 6; see also SUAREZ, De Censuris, in 23 OPERA OMNIA,
supra note 21, at 5, disp. 1, § 2, no. 3.
254. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 440, disp. 18, § 1,
no. 9.

255. d. Suirez stated:
Tertio, quia revera non est ilia defensio, sed aggressio; unde est virtualis
coactio ad fidem, vel saltem ad auditum fidei, quae non est licita, ut statim
dicemus. [QJuia si praedicatores mittantur cum exercitu, illi ad quos mittuntur, morali modo, et non sine apparenti ratione, praesument mitti potius ad
occupandam provinciam, quam ad procurandum salutem spiritualem

eorum. Unde loquendo etiam regulariter, juste defendi poterunt, juxta
prudentem presumptionem; ergo datur illis occasio justi belli, et ita ilia
reducitur potius ad aggressionem quam ad defensionem. Quod si alii non
possint resistere, et timore cedant, jam ilia est maxima coactio. Unde confirmatur, quia illud medium non est aptum ad introducendam fidem, nam
cedit in injuriam et infamiam ejus; existimabunt enim infideles nostram
fidem dare licentiam violandi jura gentium, imo et jus naturae, occupando

res alienas, invitis dominis, et inferendo bellum sine titulojusto. Unde duriores etiam fient, et magis indispositi ad fidem suscipiendam.

Id. [748] On the "most absurd" hypothesis of a war that would be just on both sides,
see SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 744, disp. 13, § 4, no. 1.
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barely touched this issue. At that time, he did not explicitly
speak of "anticipated security," and he made no distinction
among those who would employ such a notion. Instead, he
contented himself with declaring simply that "those people
were very much in error who said that a Christian prince could
occupy a province of the Gentiles solely in order that the Gospel be more expeditiously preached there. '25 6 Then, more
concisely than in 1614, he went on to say that their view was
clearly against the teaching of Christ and the practice of the
Church. Besides that, the course they proposed would lead
not to the Gospel's being better promoted [persuadendum] but
2 57
rather to its being despised [odiosum].)
For these reasons, Suirez believed that peaceful means
should first be attempted. Unbelieving princes and republics
could be invited and asked (more than once if necessary) to
permit the Christian faith to be preached in their realms. They
could also be asked to provide or permit security for persons
entering their realms or dwelling in them for such a task. But
if these nonbelieving princes resisted and were unwilling to allow the entrance of preachers, then, said Sufirez, they could be
forced-by sending preachers with a sufficient army.2 58
If, similarly, after preachers had been admitted, these unbelievers killed them or injured them solely on account of their
256. Suirez, De Fide II, supra note 30, at 220, disp. 5, question 4 ("sequitur valde
esse deceptos eos, qui dixerunt principem christianum occupare posse provinciam
gentilium hoc solo titulo, ut commodius possit ibi praedicari evangelium").
257. Id. To my mind, Suirez's development between 1583 and 1614 lends some
support to the thesis of Henri Bernard, S.J. that Sufrez in 1614 was thinking of the
controversy occasioned by the Jesuit, Alonso Sinchez, who had encouraged Philip II
to extend the realm of Christianity and his own dominions by making war upon
China (and in the process exploiting the enmity that existed between the Chinese and
the Japanese). See generally Henri Bernard, supra note 27. Because he did not have
the 1583 lectures, Bernard was not able to comment upon them or use them in any
way to bolster his thesis.
258. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 440, disp. 18, § 1,
no. 10. Suirez stated:
Quapropter dicendum est prius esse tentanda media pacis, invitando et
rogando semel atque iterum infideles principes et respublicas, ut permittant
in suis regnis praedicari fidem, et offerant vel permittant securitatem personis qui ad illud munus praestandum sua regna ingredientibus, vel in illis
commorantibus.... Quod si principes infideles resistant, et ingressum concedere nollent, tunc existimo cogi posse, mittendo praedicatores cum sufficienti exercitu.
Id. [748].
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preaching, then Sua'rez saw even more basis for a just defense
or sometimes even reason for just vengeance because it was
consistent with natural law and not against any command of
Christ. And if the early Church did not use this manner of coercion, he thought it was not because it would have been unlawful, but because the Church did not then have the temporal
forces to resist the enemies of the faith. Moreover, to Sua'rez,
Christ in the beginning wished to subdue the world by the efficacy of the word and of miracles, in order to better show his
might and the truth of his doctrine.259
B. Is It Permissiblefor the Church or for Christian Princes to Force
260
These Unbelievers to Listen to the Faith?

To this question, Suirez suggested, there are two opposite
answers. The first says flatly that this is licit. Major seemed to
think this, although he did not say so explicitly. The initial argument, as Suirez reports it, is that if unbelievers could not be
forced to hear it then the commission to teach would be pointless or nugatory. Another argument in support of the first answer could be made a simili. For when Christ gave His disciples
power to forgive sins, the Church, it is reasoned, rightly inferred that the faithful should confess their sins. So here,
when Christ gave the command to teach all nations, the
Church rightly inferred that He gave it the power to force them
to listen. Yet another argument turns on the lawful use of
force if there be any resistance to the preaching of the faith.
But if the unbelievers did not want to listen, they were neces261
sarily resisting.
259. Id. at 440-41, no. 10. Suirez stated:
[E]t simili modo, si, post receptos praedicatores, eos, sine culpa, et absque
alia causa, propter praedicationem Evangelii interficiant, vel injuriose
tractent, tunc etiam augetur ratio justae defensionis, imo justae vindictae,
quae interdum necessaria est ut alii infideles principes coerceantur, et similes tyrannides exercere vereantur. Nam hoc est consentaneum juri naturali,
et non est contra aliquod Christi praeceptum. Quod si in principio Ecclesiae
non habebat temporales vires ad resistendum hostibus fidei. Voluit etiam
Christus Dominus in principio vincere mundum efficacia verbi et
miraculorum, ut potentiam suam et veritatem suae doctrinae magis ostenderer.
Id. [749].
260. Id. at 441, § 2 ("Utrum liceat Ecclesiae vel principibus christianis cogere
hos infideles ad audiendum fidem.") [749].
261. Id. no. 1.
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A second answer simply says that it is not right to force
unbelievers to listen to the faith, whether or not they are temporally subject to the Church or to Christian princes. For one
thing, there is no record that Christ gave this power to the
Church-nor can one infer that He did. Second, this kind of
coercion seems contrary to the example of Christ himself.
Third, beyond this, the faith is voluntary-therefore the means
used to spread it should be voluntary. Fourth, such coercion,
whether direct or indirect, demands a jurisdiction that the
Church or Christian rulers obviously do not have over nonsubject unbelievers. But even if the Church has temporal jurisdiction over some unbelievers-in view of the earlier discussed
limits of such jurisdiction, it would not extend to a spiritual
262
matter such as forcing them to listen to the Faith.
A third and middle answer, with which Sufirez agreed, distinguishes between those unbelievers who are subject and
those who are not subject to Christian princes. It is, he said,
acceptable for Christian princes to force unbelievers subject to
them to listen to the faith.2 63 In this, he said, he was much
moved by "the Roman example"-i.e., the Popes forcing the
Jews subject to them at Rome to listen once a week to the
preaching of the Christian faith. Specifically, he mentions two
papal bulls: Vineam, issued by Pope Nicholas III in August of
1278, and Sancta mater Ecclesia, from Pope Gregory XIII on
September 1, 1584. 64
262. Id. n.2. Suirez often said that the Church simply lacks jurisdiction over
non-subject unbelievers. See SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21,
at 428, disp. 25, § 3, no. 1; id. at 434, § 4, no. 3; SUAREZ, DeFide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA,
supra note 21, at 443, disp. 18, § 2, no. 6; SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra
note 21, at 192, 111, ch. 6, no. 1; see also SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra

note 21, at 747, disp. 13, § 5, no. 4; SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra
note 21, at 349, III, cl. 30. In the last, he said that the Church has no power over
infidel princes except in a case where they would block the preaching of the Gospel.
On the voluntary nature of faith, see Suirez, De Fide II, supra note 30, at 81, disp. 6,
question 2; see also SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 429,
disp. 25, § 3, no. 1; SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNA, supra note 21, at 133, disp.

4, § 5, no. 5; id. at 184, disp. 6, § 5, no. 5.
263. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 442, disp. 18, § 2, no.
3 ("Unde dico primo licitum esse christianis principibus cogere infideles sibi subditos
ad fidem audiendam.") [751].
264. Id. ("me multum movet exemplum Romanum; nam Summi Pontifices
cogunt Judaeos sibi subditos, ut semel in hebdomada praedicationem fidei audiant,
poena imposita his qui audire recusant; qua de re extat Bulla Nicolai III, quae incipit
Vineam; et alia Gregorii XIII, quae incipit Sancta mater Ecclesia") [751]). For more on
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It is noteworthy that Sufirez's position here changed from
that of his 1583 lectures. At that time he mentioned the Roman example, but only in the course of an argument advanced
by others in favor of forcing unbelievers to the faith.265 He
then rejected that argument but withheld judgment about the
Roman example.266 Later in the same lectures, he flatly denied
that the Church can force non-apostate unbelievers to listen to
the preaching of the faith.2

67

This discrepancy between 1583

and 1614 is at least in part explained, of course, by the fact that
Sancta mater Ecclesia did not appear until eight full months after
Sufirez's last Roman lecture De Fide in January 1584. At the
same time, in his 1583 reference to the papal example, he
could certainly have had Vineam in mind. Most likely, however,
any provisions in that 1278 bull were by 1583 largely a dead
letter. But after the appearance of Sancta mater Ecclesia, Suirez,
a strong supporter of papal authority,268 probably felt constrained to modify his opinion. In any event, his position in
1614 visibly hardened beyond that of 1583.
Indeed, even aside from papal authority and practice, in
1614 Suatrez said (with clear if unstated implications for unbelievers in the conquered regions of the New World) that reason itself could confirm the view that subject infidels could be
forced to listen. For subjects could be forced to obey a just
precept of a temporal ruler. In Sufrez's view, it was very defensible that a precept to listen to the faith was just and within
the scope of temporal power, because the act of hearing some
Vineam, see 4 BULLARUM DIPLOMATUM, supra note 246, at 45-47. For more on Sancta
mater Ecclesia, see 8 BULLARUM DIPLOMATUM, supra note 246, at 487-89. In this context, it is noteworthy that Suirez did not refer to Pope Sixtus V's "softening" in 1586
of Gregory XIII's decree of the year before. See Pope Sixtus V, Christianapietas, in 8
BULLARUM DiPLOMATUM, supra note 246, at 788 ("Li uomini maschi ebrei siano tenuti
andare ad udire prediche e sermoni di cristiani tre volte I'anno, quando saranno invitati o chiamati da' predicatori, e tre altre volte I'anno in qualche solenniti, quando
paresse o fossero invitati dalli ordinari; nel resto del tempo niuno sia astretto, ma
possi andarvi i suo beneplacito anco non invitato.").
265. Suirez, De Fide I, supra note 30, at 185, disp. 5, question 1. ("Tertio sumi
potest ex Ecclesia Romana, quae compellit Judaeos subditos ad audiendam fidei
praedicationem, non posset autem compellere ad hoc medium, nisi posset compellere ad fidem.").
266. Id. at 192 ("quidquid sit de antecedenti, negatur consequentia").
267. Id. at 219, question 4 ("Dico tertio: Non potest Ecclesia cogere infideles
non apostatas ad audiendam suam praedicationem.").
268. For Suirez's views on the Jesuits' "fourth vow," of obedience to the Pope,
see SUAREZ, De SocietateJesu, in 16 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 854-66, VI, ch. 4.
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preaching was not directly and intrinsically supernatural, and
subjects could be shown that it was good. As a matter of fact, it
could be related to the republic's advantage which the ruler is
obliged to procure. Thus it could lead to greater concord and
peace among all subjects; or the unbelievers themselves could
be liberated from errors against natural reason. Or, as in the
case of the Jews, they could be "liberated from errors at odds
2 69
with other things which they themselves admit and believe.
Or finally, Sufirez contended, listening to the faith could be
commanded so that those subjects could choose the true religion and the true worship of God-which, consistent with what
we have seen, he believed should be promoted in every wellmanaged republic. 7 °
The arguments in support of the second answer, inasmuch
as they might be restricted to non-subject unbelievers, do not
conflict with this. Suairez further agreed that no special empowerment from Christ forces unbelievers to listen. On the
opposite side, he maintained that such empowerment is not
necessary; the ordinary power of a temporal prince was
enough.27' Therefore, the example of Christ is not relevant.
In response to the argument about coercion to the faith,
Sufirez granted the antecedent, but denied the consequence.
He believed that someone could be coerced into hearing without being coerced to believe. 7 2 Again, to Suirez, a command
to hear the faith need not be imposed under the precise rationale of believing a supernatural faith. To Suairez, it might well
be imposed under the general rationale of choosing the true
religion and avoiding errors repugnant to reason, and would
evidently thus fall within the purview of the temporal power of
the state.2 7 3
As regards unbelievers not subject to Christian authority, it
was in Suirez's view unlawful to force them to listen to the
faith. This, he believed, was more certain than that which was
269. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OMNIA OPERA, supra note 21, at 442, disp. 18, § 2, no.
4 ("vel quia contra alia militant, quae ipsi admittunt et credunt, utJudaeis contigit").
270. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 442, disp. 18, § 2,
no. 4.
271. d. no. 5 ("fatemur non fieri hoc speciali potestate a Christo data, sed sufficere ordinariam potestatem principis temporalis") [753].
272. Id. ("dato antecedente, negatur consequentia, turn quia potest quis cogi ad
audiendum, non autem ad credendum") [753].
273. See id.

1991-1992]

SUAREZ AND THE INDIANS

927

just asserted about subject unbelievers, and it is commonly accepted. He thought the arguments of the second opinion
proved it. Every coercion, direct or indirect, requires in the
one coercing some jurisdiction or authority over the one he is
coercing. 277 But, from the facts of this case, Christian princes
would have no power or jurisdiction over these unbelievers.
Likewise, the Church had no power over them, spiritual or
temporal.2 75 Indeed, this last is in the princes and kings of the
unbelievers themselves, who for Sua'rez were "supreme in their
2 76
own order.

Suirez next replied to the reasons advanced by those who
would indiscriminately force all unbelievers to listen. To him,
the efficacy of preaching lies not in any capacity to coerce, but
in the power of the word itself and in the example of life and
virtue of those preaching it. 2 77 Moreover, it does not follow

that, without force, the power of preaching would be frustrated. For if someone preached, he thought, generally speaking there would be others who would voluntarily listen. As for
the argument a simili: the power to remit sins is a power of
jurisdiction, and in this it is very far from the power to preach.
Finally, to Sufirez there was a great difference between resisting those who sinfully impede preaching and forcing people to listen, because the first was a morally necessary means
and it presupposes an injury, which it is permissible to repel,
whereas neither of these is true as regards the second.2 78
Someone may object to this last point that if the rulers of
some unbelieving kingdom refuse to admit preachers of the
Gospel and if the Church cannot coerce them to allow the Gospel to be preached there, then the people of that kingdom
would not be properly provided for. 2 79 To this objection
274. Id. at 443, no. 6 ("omnis coactio, sive directa, sive indirecta sit, requirit in
cogente aliquamjurisdictionem seu potestatem in eum quem cogit") [754].
275. Id.; see supra note 249 and accompanying text.
276. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 443, disp. 18, § 1,

no. 6 ("haec est in principibus et regibus eorum, qui in suo ordine sunt supremi")
[754].
277. In at least one place Suirez stated that the task of preaching the Gospel
requires "learning and righteousness" (doctrina et probitas). See SUAREZ, De Societate
Jesu, in 17 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 975-76, IX, ch. 1,nos. 19-20; see also supra
note 244 and accompanying text.
278. See SuAREz, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 443, disp. 18, § 2,
no. 7.
279. Id. no. 8.
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Su~irez allowed that, "morally speaking" (moraliter loquendo),
there were some cases like this in which coercion would be permitted. For example, if an unbelieving republic wished to hear
preachers and its unbelieving king stood in the way, the republic itself could resist him. In this it could be aided by Christian
princes-to the end that the unwilling king permit the preaching of the faith. For in acting as he did, he was, for Suzrez,
doing injury to his subjects, by blocking their way to salva-

tion.280
By the same reasoning, Suirez thought, if a king desired
to hear preaching, and was resisted by nobles or by the kingdom, he could physically force his subjects, and if he lacked the
power to do so, he could also be helped by Christian
princes. 28 ' Finally, if both the king and the kingdom resisted,
Suarez thought they could be compelled to permit preachers
of the Gospel to work in their territories. This, he believed,
was required by the jus gentium and it should not be impeded
without just cause. 8 Therefore, the king and kingdom could
be forced to admit preachers, who could themselves without
force or fraud speak the word of God to those wanting to listen. There would always be some such listeners and in this
case there would not be any coercion to hearing the faith, but
only to not impeding the preaching of the Gospel. 3
280. Id. at 443-44 ("Nihilominus existimo, moraliter loquendo, tunc esse licitam
aliquam coactionem, et imprimis si respublica infidelis velit habere praedicatores, et
rex infidelis impediat, potest respublica illi resistere, et in hoc potest juvari a
principibus christianis, ut rex invitus fidei praedicationem permittat, quia in hoc injuriam facit subditis .... ) [756]; see Suirez, De Fide 11, supra note 30, at 221, disp. 5,
question 4.
281. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 444, disp. 18, § 2, no.
8 ("et eadem ratione, si rex consentiat seu desideret, et non audeat propter resistentiam primatum, seu regni, potest per vim cogere subditos, et si vires illi desint, potest
in hoc etiam juvari a principibus christianis") [756]; see Suirez, De Fide II, supra note
30, at 221, disp. 5, question 4.
282. SUREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 444, disp. 18, § 2, no.
8 ("Denique si rex et regnum resistant simul, arbitror cogi posse ut permittant
praedicatores Evangelii versari in terris suis, quia hoc est debitum jure gentium, et
non potest sine justa causa impediri") [756].
283. See id.

1991-1992]

SUAREZ AND THE INDIANS

929

C. After Sufficient Presentationof the Gospel, Is It Permissible to
Force Those Unbelievers to Believe Who Have Heard It
Enough?284
This question can be raised about unbelievers subject or
not subject to the temporal power of the Church. The first
opinion is that it is licit to force unbelievers, even those not
subject, to accept the Christian faith if it has been sufficiently
proposed to them. This, Sufirez explained, was the view of Major,285 and, "as is reported, a certain Gin6s Sepiilveda in the
time of Charles the Fifth vehemently defended it with respect
to the business of theJews. 28 6 This opinion can be based first
upon the words of Christ in the parable of the great feast:
"Compel them to enter.

' 28 7

It can be further confirmed by the

example of Christ, who forced St. Paul to receive the faith.
Again, it could be argued rationally inasmuch as those unbelievers were sinning most seriously in not accepting the sufficiently heard faith. Therefore, they could be justly punished
for that sin, and through that punishment forced to accept the
faith. Again, an argument was made to the effect that in such
coercion one could hope for a great advantage, especially in
future generations. For, the reasoning ran, even if those who
are forced to convert do so in a faithless or fraudulent way,
their descendents, who would be much more numerous, will
more easily believe, and many innocent children would be
saved through baptism.28 8
284. Id. at 444, § 3 ("Utrum post sufficientem propositionem Evangelii, liceat
cogere ad credendum hos infideles qui illud sufficienter audierunt."). Note that this
question does not seem to have been raised in the 1583 lectures, in which Suirez
considered the idea of "sufficiently heard" or "sufficiently preached" in the context
of invincible ignorance rather than force.
285. See MAJOR, supra note 59, at f. 188v, disp. 44, question 4.
286. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 444, disp. 18, § 3,
no. 1 ("ut fertur, tempore Caroli V, in negotioJudaeorum, hanc partem vehementer
defendit quidam Genesius Sepulveda.") [757].
287. Luke 14:23.
288. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 444, disp. 18, § 3,
no. 1. For other mentions of Sep6lveda (whose name definitely suggests the American Indian question), see id. at 449, § 4, no. 2; SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 429, disp. 25, § 3, no. 1; SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA

supra note 21, at 747, disp. 13, § 5, no. 5. On the conversion or expulsion of
the Jews from Spain, by the order on March 31, 1492 of Ferdinand and Isabella, see
Jos6 Luis Gonzilez Novalin, La Inquisicidnespafiola, in II-2* HISTORIA DE LA IGLESIA EN
ESPARA, supra note 250, at 134-35.
OMNIA,
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The second opinion held that the Church or Christian
princes could compel unbelievers subject to them to accept the
faith. This opinion was held principally by Duns Scotus in IV
Sentences, disputation 4, question 6. It is founded initially on
the arguments supporting the first opinion. To this could be
added the example of the practice of the Church-in the case
of Spain. Spanish kings have used this power. For example,
Ferdinand forced the Moors to accept the Christian faith, and
King Sisebutus did the same centuries earlier with the Jews.
And for that, this latter king was praised at the Fourth Council
of Toledo in the year 633 (chapter 56) and is referred to in the
Decretum Gratiani (chapter DeJudaeis, dist. 45), as well as in the
Decretales GregoriiIX (chapter Majores, para. ult. De Baptismo). In
28 9
other places also this opinion is favored.
For this second opinion, a particular argument could be
added as regards subject unbelievers. Advocates contend that
this coercion does not contradict the faith, and the Church
lacks neither the power (potestas) nor a reason to coerce such
unbelievers. That such coercion is not contradictory of the
faith would thus be proven from the example of heretics whom
the Church had forced to adopt the faith. That that power
would not be lacking is proven inasmuch as such unbelievers
were here supposed to be subjects of Christian princes, who
then would have power to force them, especially in matters
necessary for their salvation. Again, a lower prince could force
a subject to obey the law of a higher prince-in this case the
law of the heavenly Prince. A prince could force his subjects
not to blaspheme the Christian religion or to do any injury to
it, but these unbelievers by not believing would then be
blaspheming the faith proposed to them, and could be punished and forced to convert. Also, those supporting this position expected many good results from coercion, either for the
289. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 444, disp. 18, § 3,
no. 2. For the authorities cited, see 1 CORPUS JURIS CANONICI 161-62 (Aemilius
Friedberg ed., 1879-81) (citing Decretum Gratiani, DeJudaeis,I, disp. 45, ch. 5); 2 id. at
646 (citing Decretales Gregorii IX, Majores, lib. 3, tit. 42, ch. 3); J.D. MANSI, 10
SACRORUM
CONCILIORUM
NOVA
COLLECTIO
633 (1759) (citing CONCILIUM
TOLENTANUM IV). For Ferdinand's order of March 14, 1502 forcing the Moors to
choose between conversion and expulsion, as well as for treatment of the Moors in
Spain in the sixteenth century, see Rafael Benitez Sinchez-Blanco & Eugenio Ciscar
Pallar~s, La Iglesia ante la conversidn y la expulsidn de los moriscos, in 4 HISTORIA DE LA
IGLESIA EN ESPAI&A, supra note 251, at 253-307.
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parents or children and generations to come. Accordingly, the
argument here was that it is better for these unbelievers even
to feign a conversion to Christianity rather than remain in
2
worse error.

90

The third opinion was common among theologians and
was also Suirez's own view. Under this view, non-apostate unbelievers, whether subjects or non-subjects, could not be
forced to accept the faith, even though it might have been sufficiently proposed to them. 2 9 ' This was the position of Thomas

Aquinas2 92 and also, among others, of Vitoria, in his Relectio(nes) de Indis. Suirez explained it through its parts: first as
regards non-subject unbelievers and then with regard to those
who are subject. Again, he first spoke about direct coercion
and then about indirect coercion.293
It was, he said, intrinsically evil to force non-subject unbelievers to accept the Christian faith. Such coercion, he believed, could not be employed without legitimate power (potestas)-otherwise, any act of violence could be justified. The
Church, however, did not have legitimate power with regard to
these unbelievers, because Christ did not give it such power.
Had he granted power to force these unbelievers to hear the
faith, he certainly did not grant power to force them to accept
it. Secondly, this could be proven by "negative authority"for neither in the tradition and practice of the Church nor in
Scripture is there any evidence of such power. For that passage of Luke, "Compel them to enter," has a quite different
sense, which we will see below. Third, Suirez thought it could
be proven positively from the words of St. Paul: "What to me
are those who are outside? For God will judge them. '2"9 4 This
doubtless is because they are not subject to Christian jurisdiction, which is the way Pope Innocent III in the Decretals (chap290. See

SUAREZ,

De Fide, in 12 OPERA

OMNIA,

supra note 21, at 444, disp. 18, § 3,

no. 2.

291. Id. at 445 n.4 ("Nihilominus tertia et communis sententia Theologorum
est, infideles non apostatas, tam subditos quam non subditos, ad fidem suscipiendam
cogi non posse, etiamsi sufficientem illius propositionem habuerint.") [760]; see
SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 429, disp. 25, § 3, no. 1.
292. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 56, 111, question 10,
arts. 8, 12.

293.

SUAREZ,

De Fide, in 12

5.
294. 1 Corinthians 5:12-13.

OPERA OMNIA,

supra note 21, at 445, disp. 18, § 3, no.
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ters Majores and Gaudemus) understood it. Also the Council of
Trent, Session fourteen, chapter two, has said: "The Church
exercises judgment over no one who has not first entered by
baptism. "295 Again, Christ, in Matthew, instructed the Apostles
that they should not carry a staff or a sword-in which place St.
Jerome noted that he prohibited instruments of coercion and
taught peace.2 96 And at the end of the same passage, Christ
said: "To those who do not receive you it will be requited on
the day of judgment, "297 signifying that God reserved punishment of this sin for Himself.
The same thing is proven according to Suirez on the basis
of canon law. This coercion was prohibited with respect to the
Jews in the Decretals (chapter Sicut Judaei) and in the Decretum
(chapters Sincere and deJudaeis, dist. 45). And in the Decretals
(chapter Majores), about Baptism, it is said to be against the
Christian religion. If this power had been given by Christ, reasoned Suirez, it would not be found immediately in temporal
princes but in the bishops and the popes. But these have not
29 8
said that they have such power nor have they ever used it.
Finally, argued Suirez, this way of drawing men to the
faith was not fitting. Instead, much more appropriately, the
first acceptance and profession of the faith should be completely spontaneous. This should be so that the efficacy of the
divine word and the grace of God might be shown in this work.
It is especially the work of God, as Christ has said, and therefore St. Paul has said: "The weapons of this army are not carnal." 2 99 Again, that way of coercion is exposed to many disad295. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 445, disp. 18, § 3,
no. 5. For the authorities cited, see 1 CORPUS JURIS CANONICI, Supra note 289, at 646
(citing Majores); id. at 723-24 (citing Decretales Gregorii IX, Gaudemus, lib. 4, tit. 19, cl.
8); Concilium Tridentinum, sess. XIV, ch. 2, inENCHIRIDION SYMBOLORUM 392 n.1671
(Henricus Denzinger & Adolfus Sch6nmetzer eds., 1963).
296. Matthew 10:10; for Jerome, see S. Hieronymi Presbyteri Commentariorum, in
Matheum Libri IV, in 77 CORPUS CHRISTIANORUM, SERIES LATINA 66 (D. Hurst & M.
Adriaen, eds., 1969) ("Qui habemus auxilium, baculi praesidium cur quaeramus?").

297. Matthew 10:10.
298. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 445, disp. 18, § 3,
no. 5. For references, see 2 CORPUS JURIS CANONICI, supra note 289, at 774 (discussing Decretales Gregorii IX, SicutJudaei, lib. 3, tit. 42, ch. 3). I note that "Sincere," discussed in the text accompanying note note 298 should be "Qui sincera." See 1 CORPUS
JURIS CANONICI, supra note 289, at 160 (discussing Decretum Gratiani,I, disp. 45, ch. 3);
supra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing Dejudaeis and Maiores).

299. 1 Corinthians 1:36,
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vantages. Most likely it would lead to many simulated conversions and innumerable sacrileges. Moreover, the unbelievers
would be scandalized and they would blaspheme the Christian
300
religion, if they were forced into it.
That the Church has no special supernatural power regarding non-subject unbelievers needs no proof here-for he
is supposing that they are not its subjects. Therefore, it has no
other power over them. For in Sufirez's view, there existed no
other power immediately from God, or as a right of nature.
Instead, he considered all temporal power in human republics
to be by means of human convention and the jus gentium.
Hence no republic or prince had this power with respect to
foreigners, but only with respect to members of that republic.
These unbelievers not only were not members of the Church,
but were also supposed not to be members of any civil republic
subject to a Christian prince. Therefore, no temporal power of
Christians extended to them.3 0 '
Nor could the Church directly coerce unbelievers temporally subject to it to accept the faith. Such direct coercion required power and jurisdiction, and from what has been said it
is evident that the Church does not have such jurisdiction.
The Church is not forbidden to have civil power over these
subject unbelievers, for they could be members of a civil republic over which the Church might exercise such power, such
as in the case of the Papal States. Nevertheless, to Suirez that
power did not extend to punishing subjects for the sin of not
accepting the faith if it has been sufficiently proposed to
them. °2 Suirez believed that power as it is given immediately
to men is ordained only for such natural ends as peace in the
republic and the natural justice and honesty compatible with
that, but that this sin of infidelity is altogether outside that or300. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 446, disp. 18, § 3,
no. 6. For allusions to dissembling on the part of "new Christians," see SUAREZ, De
Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 440-41, disp. 25, § 5, nos. 3-4. For
other references to this verse of Corinthians, see supra note 247 and accompanying
text.
301. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 445, disp. 18, § 3,
no. 6; Suirez, De Fide II, supra note 30, at 201-02, disp. 5, question 2.
302. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 446, disp. 18, § 3, no.
7 ("nihilominus tamen illa potestas non extenditur ad hunc actum puniendi subditos
propter peccatum non suscipiendi fidem ipsis sufficienter propositam" [763]).
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der and end.3 °3
Nevertheless, indirect coercion to accept the Faith is not intrinsically evil, Sua'rez believed, if it is done with proper limitations. Coercion is indirect when a right abridged or a punishment suffered under one title, or on account of one fault, is
secondarily ordered by the one inflicting that punishment to
induce the one receiving it to do something else. But in the
present case there is power to punish or to coerce for some
just end, and to Suarez the other secondary end of conversion
to the faith is not bad; indeed of itself it is good. Therefore,
also that indirect coercion of itself is not bad but indeed it can
be good. °4
The question now is with what limitations should indirect
coercion be employed. Suirez found two. One is that in imposing the burden, or in inflicting evil, one must not overstep
the bounds ofjustice. So, for example, a tribute or a penalty
may be increased for just reason up to a certain point, beyond
which it would become excessive. Similarly, Catholic princes
could, if they have just reason, exclude unbelievers from their
kingdom-for example, if they were harming the faithful. Or,
if they were conquered in a just war, they might by that title be
expelled and, as it were, punished by exile. Or if they were
guests or travelers, they might be denied permanent residence.
In such cases a Christian prince could refuse to permit unbelievers to dwell in his kingdom, unless they were converted,
and then that would be a kind of indirect coercion. However,
it was necessary in all cases that the exclusion or expulsion be
for just reason. 0 5
A second necessary condition was that the outcome of
conversion be pursued prudently. This coercion, even though
indirect, carries with it the danger of false conversion. Therefore, one must completely avoid admitting these unbelievers to
the faith, or to the Sacraments, without sufficient examination
and the moral certitude that the conversion is real. But care for
this belongs more to the pastors of the Church than to tempo303. Id. at 446-47 ("quia ilia potestas sicut est proxime ab hominibus, ita solum
ordinatur ad naturalem finem, et praesertim ad servandam pacem reipublicae, et
naturalem justitiam, ac honestatem ad ilium finem convenientem. At vero illud peccatum infidelitatis est omnino extra ilium ordinem et finem .
) [763].
304. Id. at 447, no. 8.
305. Id. no. 9.
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ral princes.3 0 6
At this point, Suirez replied to the arguments of those
who said it is licit to force unbelievers to the faith. Their first
argument was taken from Christ's words: "Compel them to
enter." Suirez believes the correct interpretation of this to be
that these words refer to the situation at the end of the worldwhen those who are left will be compelled by signs and miracles and by the efficacy of the word of God. Their second argument is taken from the power to punish sins. To this Suirez
replied that God did not give anyone power to punish all the
sins of others, or else the human race could not be governed in
peace and justice. Instead, he said, God reserved some matters for his own judgment, and that among these was infidelity.
To the argument that forced conversion would result in those
coming after being more easily and more faithfully converted,
his reply was that one should not do evil to gain a good result.
But he also believed that experience shows that through coercion that result is not achieved-indeed, just the opposite happens.

30 7

Turning to the arguments of the second opinion, Sua'rez
answered as follows. In these arguments, the best examples
adduced of the kings of Spain concerned indirect compulsion
employed with a just title, such as it was employed by their
Catholic Majesties, Ferdinand and Isabella. As regards King
Sisebutus, who apparently acted to excess, what was praised
was his intention but not his deed. To the argument about a
superior law: this would be true with respect to subjects if
there were a commission from a supreme prince. Here, however, Sua'rez noted that God had not committed such power to
men. Finally, he believed, it was not enough to present faith as
evidently credible; in order to justify coercion, there was also
required empowerment, which would be lacking in this case. 08
306. Id.; see Suirez, De Fide M, supra note 30, at 192, disp. 5, question 1. For
more on what Suirez required of evangelists, see SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 135, disp. 4, § 5, no. 10.
307. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 448, disp. 18, § 3, no.
12.
308. Id. no. 13.
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D. May Infidels Be Forced to Abandon Their Errors or Their False
Not Only to
Religious Practices When These Are Contrary
30 9
the Faith but Also to Reason?
Sua'rez's question at this point presupposes an earlier division of the subject matter of faith.3 t0 One part related to entirely supernatural mysteries while the other related to things
naturally knowable. Coinciding with this division, infidelity
was twofold: a person could disbelieve only supernatural
truths or he could also disbelieve matters naturally knowable.
Up to this point, Sulirez had treated only the first kind of infidelity. But now he considered the second as well. More precisely, the question is whether unbelievers could be forced to
believe that which is reasonably right, or right merely on the
basis of human, as opposed to divine, faith. Coupled with this
was the question of whether unbelievers could be forced to
abandon external religious rites, such as idolatry, which are
contrary to that. Once more, the distinction between unbelievers who are temporally subject and those who are not so subject applies.3 1 '
In his answer, Sua'rez stated that Major and Sepfilveda had
argued that non-subject pagans could be forced to worship
one God and to abandon idolatrous rites. If they were unwilling, they could be justly punished and deprived of their liberty
and their kingdoms. The basis of this argument was that a
Christian republic could defend the honor of God and impede
and avenge blasphemies against God. Major and Sepfilveda
supported this argument with a reference to Thomas Aquinas, 3 12 but they also offered an argument from reason. One
man could rightly defend the honor or the life of another, and
therefore, much more could a man defend the honor of
God. 3 This rule applied particularly if pagans were sacrificing adults and children to their gods; they could be forced to
stop, at least for the reason of a "defense of innocents."
309. Id. at 448, § 4 ("Utrum infideles cogi possint ut errores suos vel falsos ritus,
non solum fidei, sed etiam rationi contrarios, derelinquant.") [767].
310. Id. at 429, disp. 17, § 2, no. 1.
311. Id. at 448-49, disp. 18, § 4, no. 1.
312. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 56, II-I1, question 94,
art. 3, ad. 1.
313. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 449, disp. 18, § 4, no.
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Therefore, Christian princes could do the same with respect to
any pagans for the reason of a defense of God's honor. 314 Finally, they held, certain peoples are so barbarous and so illadapted to gaining knowledge of God by themselves that they
seem as it were by nature born to slavery, as Aristotle said.
Therefore, particularly on this account, they could be coerced
to a true knowledge of God and good morals. 5
In common with that of most other theologians, Suarez's
own reply to the question of forcing non-subject unbelievers to
abandon their errors was negative. A persuasive argument for
this might be taken, he thought, from the fact that God did not
permit the Israelites to war on the inhabitants of the Promised
Land because of their idolatry, but rather because of the injury
of their refusing peaceful transit through their territory. From
this, he said, there follows a general rule, which would preclude an otherwise unmerited forcing of non-subject unbelievers to abandon their idolatry: "it is not lawful for any prince to
make war 'on these nations,' except to repel 6or to avenge an
1
injury done by them to him or his people.

3

The reasoning then is the same as that touched upon
above. To Suirez, there was in the Church no jurisdiction over
these non-subject unbelievers, and coercion or punishment
without jurisdiction was not just. Therefore, even as one private person could not punish or coerce another private person,
or one Christian king punish or coerce another, or one unbelieving king punish or coerce another, so neither could the
Church punish an unbelieving republic, which is "in its own
314. Id. ("Confirmatur primo, quia si gentiles sacrificent homines vel infantes
Diis suis, possunt cogi ne id faciant, saltem propter defensionem innocentium; ergo
idem facere principes christiani respectu quorumcumque gentilium, propter defensionem honoris Dei.") [768].
315. Id. ("Denique confirmatur, quia quaedam gentes sunt ita barbarae et ineptae ad Dei cognitionem per se obtinendam, ut videantur quasi a natura genitae ad
servitutem, ut dixit Aristoteles, I Polit., cap. 1 et 3; ergo vel hoc titulo cogi possunt
ad veram cognitionem et honestos mores.") [768-69]. Note Suirez's hesitation here
in stating an opinion that he himself will reject. With his use of "quasi" and "videantur," he appears to suggest that Major and Sepfilveda did not really believe what they
were saying.
316. Id. n.3 ("[U]nde ibi colligitur generalis regula, non esse licitum principi
bellum facere his nationibus, nisi ad propulsandam vel vindicandam injuriam sibi aut
suis factam; ergo sola ratio tollendi idolatriam non est sufficiens ad justam coactionem.") [769]; see SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 743,
disp. 13, § 4, no. 1; id. at 747, § 5, no. 2.
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order supreme," on account of the republic's transgressions,
17
despite the fact that these may be against natural reason.'
It is hardly relevant that such transgressions could be
against God. For, as noted earlier, God did not set men up as
judges to avenge injuries to Him in all things with respect to all
men. Instead, in this He wished to preserve an order. Accordingly, said Sua'rez, so that subjects would obey their princes
and lest otherwise greater evils would follow, God reserved for
himself judgment of supreme princes even in these matters
which belong to the natural order.3 t8
To the argument of Major and Septilveda about blasphemy, Suairez replied that although idolatry is not properly

blasphemy, an occasion for a just war could arise from blasphemy in some circumstances. This might be, for example,
when these non-subject unbelievers blaspheme not just God,
but do so in contempt of the Church, and injure Christians in

the process.31 9 Likewise, Christian princes need not be defending God's honor to prevent human sacrifices. For to intervene and wage war on this count, it is enough "to be defending
innocent persons. ' 's32 That is to say, in order to prevent these
unbelievers from sacrificing children to their gods, to wage war
would be lawful as a matter of charity-indeed, it was a com317. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 449, disp. 18, § 4, no.
3. Suirez stated:
Ratio autem est eadem quae in superioribus tacta est, quia in Ecclesia non
est jurisdictio super hos infideles, et coactio vel punitio sine jurisdictione
non est justa. Quocirca sicut unus homo privatus non potest alium etiam
privatum punire vel cogere, neque unus rex fidelis ab alio fideli, neque infidelis ab infideli, ita neque respublica infidelis, in suo ordine suprema, potest puniri ab Ecclesia propter sua delicta, etiamsi contra rationem
naturalem sint ....
Id. [769].
318. Id. no. 4 ("Deus non constituit hominesjudices ad vindicandas suas injurias
in omnibus respectu onium hominum, sed in hoc voluit ordinem servari, ut subditi
principibus parerent, supremos autem principes suo judicio reservavit in his quae ad
naturalem ordinem pertinent, quia majora mala ex opposito sequerentur.") [770]; see
Suirez, De Fide III, supra note 30, at 192, disp. 6, question 1; supra note 195 and
accompanying text.
319. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 449, disp. 18, § 4, no.
4 ("deinde dicitur tunc posse principem christianum cogere hos infideles ne blasphement, quando id faciunt in contemptum Ecclesiae, et injuriam religionis christianae;
quia tuncjam inde oritur titulusjusti belli, sicut etiam cogi possunt ne Christianis sint
infesti, neque illos in errorem inducant, aut fidem deserere cogant")[770].
320. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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mand, if it could be done successfully. 3 2 ' Suirez added that

this may be done not only to liberate children, but also
adults-even if they themselves consented and wished to be
sacrificed to idols. For in this, he thought, these adults were
worse than madmen. Moreover, to Sua'rez they were not the
anyone could be conlords of their own lives, for which reason
3 22
strained by another not to kill himself.

A limitation on this power, he said, was that it applied only
when the killings are unjust. For if these unbelievers customarily sacrificed to their idols only criminals justly condemned to
death, Sua'rez believed, they could not be compelled to desist
on the basis of that alone. While such a custom might be a sin
of idolatry it would not be a sin against justice, and so the "defense of the innocent" reason would not be present.3 2 3
As for Aristotle's dictum about natural 'slaves, this would
be appropriate, Suarez said, if there were men so uncivilized
that they would not dwell together in one republic and could
not be governed. For then, not by any title of religion, but by a
title, so to speak, of "defense of human nature," they could be
forced into some polity. Up to that time, however, Suirez
thought, people so barbarous had not been found. 2 4
In the De Caritate, he had gone farther, or at least into
slightly more detail. Thus, in the context of asking whether
321. Id. at 449-50 ("nam ad defendendos innocentes, licitum est vim inferre his
infidelibus, ne sacrificent infantes Diis suis, quia hoc juxta ordinem charitatis licet,
imo praeceptum est, si commode fieri possit") [770]; see SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12
OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 747, disp. 13, § 5, nos. 2-3; Suirez, De Fide II, supra
note 30, at 204, disp. 5, question 2 (referring also to cannibalism).
322. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 450, disp. 18, § 4, no.
4 ("Addo etiam id fieri posse non solum ad liberandos infantes, sed etiam adultos,
etiamsi ipsi consentiant et velint sacrificari idolis, quia in hoc pejores quam amentes
sunt, et quia non sunt domini propriae vitae, propter quod quilibet potest ab alio
cogi ne se occidat.") [770]; Suirez, De Fide II, supra note 30, at 204, disp. 5, question
2.
323. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 450, disp. 18, § 4, no.
4 ("Limitandum autem hoc est, quando talis occisio est injusta; nam si infideles
haberent consuetudinem sacrificandi idolis solos malefactores juste damnatos ad
mortem, non possent illo solo titulo compelli; quia in eo non contra justitiam, sed
tantum contra religionem peccant, et ita cessat defensio innocentis.") [770].
324. Id. no. 5 ("Dictum vero Aristotelis . . . haberet locum, si essent aliqui

homines adeo rudes, ut nec in unam rempublicam convenirent, nec possent
gubernari; tunc enim non titulo religionis, sed titulo, ut ita dicam, defensionis
humanae naturae ad aliquam politiam compelli; hactenus tamen, ut existimo, tam
barbarae gentes inventae non sunt.") [771].
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Christians could make war upon barbarian unbelievers, under
the title that they were "by nature slaves" who should be ruled
by wiser men, Sufirez said:
This title cannot be general, first, because it is evident that
many infidels are more naturally gifted and more adapted
for political affairs than are Christians. Second, in order
that this title have validity, it is not enough to think that
some nation has inferior natural talent. Rather it must be so
miserable that it ordinarily lives more in the manner of
beasts than of men-such as they are said to be who, inasmuch as they have no human polity, go about completely
naked, eat human flesh, etc. And if there are any suchthey can be warred against-not so that they may be killed,
but that they may be educated in a human way, and they
may be ruled with justice. Rarely, however, or never should
such a claim be admitted, except where innocent people are
being killed and similar injuries are taking place. 2 5
Sufirez never identified by name the non-subject infidels
he had in mind when he wrote this in 1584. But of the passage
quoted three things may be said. First, Suairez seemed loathe
to admit a situation that would be at complete variance from
what we have already witnessed him say is the natural condition of mankind, i.e., its coming together in political societies.
Second, if such a situation did exist, any right that it could engender to enforce the natural law would not be proper to
Christians but would be shared by every ruler who would want
to do so. 326 And, third, any motive of simply getting out to the
325. SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 747, disp. 13, § 5,
no. 5. The original reads:
At enim hic titulus primum non potest esse generalis, nam evidens est
multos esse infideles ingeniosiores fidelibus, et aptiores ad res politicas.
Secundo, ut hic titulus habeat locum, non satis est existimare aliquam na-

tionem esse ingenio inferiorem, sed esse ita inopem, ut regulariter potius
ferarum more quam hominum vivat, quales dicuntur ii qui, cum nullam
habeant humanam politiam, nudi prorsus incedunt, carnibus vescuntur
humanis, etc. Et si qui tales sunt, debellari poterunt, non ut interficiantur,
sed ut humano modo instituantur, et juste regantur. Raro tamen aut nunquam admittendus est talis titulus, nisi ubi intercedunt occisiones hominum
innocentium, et similes injuriae ....
Id. [825-26] On the rarity of obligation connected with the "defense of the innocent" title itself, which seldom can be pursued without a costly war, see Suirez, De
Fide II, supra note 30, at 205, disp. 5, question 2.
326. SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 748, disp. 13, § 5,

no. 5 ("intelligitur hunc titulum, si quis est, non esse proprium Christianorum; sed
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New World and civilizing "savages" hardly appealed to Suirez
as a just reason for making war. Again, for war some injury to
Christians on the part of those barbarian infidels was obviously
necessary-which injury, as is also obvious, could be supplied
by their resistance to the Gospel.
But what of subject unbelievers? These, he believed, could
be forced by Christian princes to profess a (natural) worship of
the true God and to abjure errors which, beyond being contrary to the faith, are also against the order of natural reason.
This is what Thomas Aquinas and other theologians believed,
and, Sufirez thought, it could be supported from Scripture. 27
Again, this could be shown, he believed, from the practice of
the Church. Christian emperors, given the opportunity, followed this practice, as did, for instance, Constantine, Jovinianus, Justinian, and Theodosius. This was further approved by
St. Augustine and St. Ambrose and many Church councils,
such as those in Africa and in Spain. 28
But in Sufirez's view it was also confirmed by reason. For
the princes in question had jurisdiction over these subject unbelievers and such coercion did not exceed that jurisdiction.
This last was proven because by reason and by natural law, it
was appropriate that a true worship of God be preserved
within the republic. Therefore, he reasoned, there is in the republic directive power to govern men to that end. Equally, the
republic has coercive power to punish contrary transgressions.
For directive power is inefficacious and of little use (outside
the Garden of Paradise) without coercive power. But this
power, insofar as it is natural, resides in Christian princes as
well. To be sure, he believed it to be in accord with the ultimately divine origin of power in the state, that it has been
granted especially as ordered toward the honor and worship of
the one God, whose ministers then, as St. Paul said, all human
eumdem pertinere ad omnem regem, qui velit servare legem naturae, ex qua praecise
considerata hic titulus oritur") [826].
327. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OMNIA OPERA, supra note 21, at 450, disp. 18, § 4, no.
6 ("et probari potest primo ex Deuteronom., decimotertio, ubi Deus praecipit interfici hujusmodi infideles propter talia delicta, nimirum quando sunt aliquo modo
subjecti .... ) [771]. See Deuteronomy 13:12-16.
328. Id. no, 6. For Suirez's sources here, see Suirez, De Fide I, supra note 30, at
196, disp. 5, question 2; id. nn. hz, ia, ib, ih, ii, il(editor's notes).
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princes are.3 29 To Sufirez,
[t]his is confirmed inasmuch as the purpose of this power is
to keep the republic in peace and justice, which cannot be
done unless it is brought to live in accord with virtue. But
men cannot live according to moral and natural virtue without true religion and the worship of the one God. Therefore, the natural power and jurisdiction of a human republic
extends also to this end.33 °
The first inference from this doctrine is that even a pagan
(ethnicus) king, if he has knowledge of the one God, could pressure (cogere) his subjects toward believing in the same, either by
their own reasoning or, if they are incapable of that, by their
putting human faith in those wiser than themselves. Consequently, he could force them to forego their idols as well as
their superstitions contrary to natural reason. 33 ' This is because in such a king there would be the whole power, which
according to natural reason belongs to a human republic.3 3 2
Second, to Suirez it followed that princes of this kind not only
could, but were obliged to use their power in this way, which is
in line with its purpose and for the good of their subjects. Further, he said, it followed that this obligation was greater in
Christian princes, because they have a greater knowledge of
the truth, and in Christian kingdoms this coercion was more
necessary for the good of the faithful themselves. Hence, to
Sufirez, Christian princes were obliged to enact laws prohibiting transgressions of this kind, because in orderly fashion they
could not punish these unless first they prohibited them with
329. Romans 13:4, 13:6; see SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note
21, at 748, disp. 13, § 5, no. 6.
330. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 450-51, disp. 18, § 4,
no. 7. The original reads:

Et confirmatur, nam finis hujus potestatis est continere rempublicam in pace
etjustitia, quod fieri non potest, nisi etiam inducatur ut secundum virtutem
vivat; non possunt autem honines vivere secundum virtutem moralem et
naturalem, sine vera religione et cultu unius Dei; ergo potestas naturalis et
jurisdictio reipublicae humanae etiam ad hunc finem extenditur.
Id. [773]; see Suirez, De Fide II, supra note 30, at 196, disp. 5, question 2.
331. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 451, disp. 18, § 4, no.
8; see SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 748, disp. 13, § 5, no.
8.
332. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 451, disp. 18, § 4, no.
8 ("Probatur, quia in tali rege est tota potestas, quae secundum rationem naturalem
humanae reipublicae convenit.") [773].
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laws. 333
Should then the religious rites of unbelievers be tolerated
under Christian rule? With regard to this question, Sua'rez followed Thomas Aquinas and distinguished two kinds of infidel
rites. 3 3 4 Some-for example, idolatry-were against natural

reason and against God, as He is known by the natural light.
(One easily thinks also of the human sacrifices connected with
the religion of the Aztecs.) Others were, indeed, superstitious
in comparison with the Christian faith, but not, however, intrinsically evil or contrary to natural reason. Sua'rez mentions
here "the rites of the Jews and perhaps many rites of the
Saracens." He saw no room for tolerance for the first kind of
rites, because he thought in such tolerance there was no benefit either for the infidels or for the republic. However, there
were, he felt, cases in which Christian princes, unable to root
out such practices without great loss to the kingdom and to
other Christian subjects, could look the other way and permit
them. This, he said, had a basis in the words of Christ: "Let
the cockle grow along with the wheat, etc."'' Also, he said,
the Church for this reason tolerated serious sins among the
faithful themselves, lest greater troubles follow; for prudence
teaches that, of many evils, the lesser should be chosen. And
charity demands that correction not take place without effect;
therefore, much less, should coercion take place when it comes
with greater damage.3 36
With respect to rites opposed not to natural law and reason but only to the Christian faith, Sufirez thought that even
unbelievers subject to Christian rule should not be forced to
abandon them because such rites were not intrinsically evil
under natural law. Hence, the power of a temporal prince did
not extend directly to their prohibition. The only reason to
prohibit them would have been that they were contrary to the
faith. But this is not reason enough with respect to these unbe333. Id. Also see SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 748,
disp. 13, § 5, no. 7, for the defense of innocents and the avenging of injuries as
belonging in a special way to Christian princes.
334. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 56, II-LI, question 10,
art. 11.
335. Matthew 13:29.
336. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 451, disp. 18, § 4,
no. 9; Suirez, De Fide 11, supra note 30, at 199-201, disp. 5, question 2.
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lievers, who are not subject to the spiritual power of the
Church. 3 7
E. May Those Infidels Be Dispossessed of All Power Which They
Have Over Faithful Christians?3 .
The question here principally concerns the political power
of rulers, and it goes to the heart of the Spanish conquest of
the New World. Again, it can be discussed with respect to rulers subject and non-subject to the spiritual power of the
Church. Also in both, subject and non-subject, distinction can
be made as regards the deprivation of this power. This deprivation can be direct because of the infidelity of the rulers themselves or indirect because of the faith of their subjects. 3 9
First, with regard to unbelieving princes, a number of
whose subjects are converted to the faith, Suirez said that they
could not be directly deprived by the Church of their power and
jurisdiction over those Christian subjects. This view, he said,
was common, and taken especially from Thomas Aquinas.3 4 °
The reasoning is as follows. Either those princes could be deprived of their power because now de facto by divine law they
would not have it, or, even though they do have it, they could
be justly stripped of it because of their unbelief. But neither of
these can be said.3 4 '
It is most certain to Sua'rez that these princes could not be
deprived of this jurisdiction for the reason that defacto by divine law they do not have it. This was proven, he said, in the
Defensio Fidei. Briefly, the reasoning was that Christ did not deprive these princes of this power. Neither did the fact of baptism exempt a Christian from the power of his king, even
though that king might be an infidel. Anything else would be
337. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12

OPERA OMNIA, supra note

21, at 451, disp. 18, § 4, no.

9.
338. Id. at 452, § 5 ("Utrum isti infideles privari possint omni superiori
potestate, quam habent in Christianos seu fideles.") [776].
339. Id. no. 1.
340. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 56, II-II, question 10,
art. 10.
341. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 453, disp. 18, § 5, no.
4 ("Fundamentum hujus veritatis est, quia vel isti principes possunt privari de facto

hac jurisdictione et potestate, quia ipso jure divino illam non habent, vel quia, licet
illam habeant, propter infidelitatem sunt ilia indigni, et ideo juste possunt ab ilia
dejici; neutrum autem horum dici potest") [778].
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against Scripture and the tradition of the Church. 4 2
For Suarez, the best philosophical argument for this position was that given by Thomas Aquinas. Political power, it was
argued, arose ultimately from natural law and thejus gentium,
but faith derived from divine supernatural law. But one law
did not destroy or affect the other. Neither was the natural law
founded upon divine positive law. Rather, it was something
presupposed as a kind of substratum for this. Accordingly,
political (positiva) power was not founded upon faith, in such a
way that someone would lose it on account of infidelity. On
the other side, political subjection did not contradict faith, or
the baptismal character, and therefore it is not lost by the fact
of baptism. 4 3
It followed evidently that unbelieving princes in possession of political power could not be stripped of that power because of their unbelief. For, Suitrez reasoned, those princes
could not, without just title, be rightly deprived of their possessions. But among their possessions was this power that they
were supposed to have over Christian subjects, and unbelief
was not a just title by which they could be deprived of it. For if
unbelief was considered precisely as an absence of faith, it did
not destroy the foundation of political power. But if unbelief
was considered a sin worthy of punishment, it was not the business of the Church to punish these unbelievers, over whom it
did not have jurisdiction. 44
At this point Suirez suggested that the Church could indirectly deprive unbelieving princes of their power over Christian
subjects. Such could be done if the benefit or the defense of
those subjects required it.3 4 5 He touched upon this, he said, in
342. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 218-19, III,
ch. 4 & nos. 4-7.
343. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 453, disp. 18, § 5, no.
3. On Christian liberty vis-d-vis political power and subjection to it, see SUAREZ,
Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 223, III, ch. 4, no. 18.
344. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 453, disp. 18, § 5,
no. 5.
345. Id. at 454 no. 6 ("Nihilominus dicendum est secundo, posse Ecclesiam indirecte privare hos principes infideles sua potestate in subditos fideles, si ad bonum
vel defensionem eorum necessariam fuerit.") [780]. Note that the condition was the
good of the subjects and not that of the Church.
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the Defensio Fidei.34 6 The reason is that baptised Christians
were subjects of the Church in spiritual things, and consequently the Church had power to rule them insofar as was necessary, "or very much fitting," for the good of their souls. Accordingly, if for this end it would have been necessary to liberate them from the power of unbelieving rulers, the power to
do this was in the Church. This is comparable to the case of
"the Pauline privilege," '3 47 in which the Church for the good of
the faith of a Christian spouse could dissolve his or her marriage to an implacable pagan. 48 Indeed, said Sua'rez, the
Church's right was stronger in the case before us, because the
marriage bond is more indissoluble than the bond of political
subjection. 4 9
Continuing, Suirez saw two ways Christian subjects could
be liberated from the power of unbelieving princes. The first
was by a simple change of residence on the part of those subjects, who might pass to a Christian kingdom. This, he said,
was a most just and easy way, one which was open to any Christian on his own authority, because he was not obliged always to
remain in the same country. Hence, if a prince were to block
Christian subjects from transit of this sort, he could be forced
to grant it by Christian princes who could then justly war
against him in defense of the faithful, inasmuch as these were
being deprived of a right which they wished to exercise.3 5 °
The second way would be to deprive a nonbelieving
prince either of his kingdom or of power over Christians remaining in his territory, which itself could hardly be accomplished without a change of princes. This was the more difficult way, one which Sua'rez believed had to be exercised with
346.
no. 21.

SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note

21, at 321, III, ch. 23,

347. See 1 Corinthians 7:15.
348. Id.; see SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 321, III,

ch. 23, no. 22; id. at 220, ch. 4, no. 9; Suirez, De Fide III, supra note 30, at 205, disp. 6,
question 3. On the "Pauline privilege," see CODE OF CANON LAw: LATIN-ENGLISH
EDITION 412-15, canons 1143-47 (1983).
349. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 454, disp. 18, § 5, no.
6 ("ergo multo magis in nostro casu, quia vinculum matrimonii de se magis est indissolubile, quam politicae subjectionis") [781]; SUAREZ, Defensio fidei, in 24 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 220, III, ch. 4, no. 9. This is evidently a corollary from the
primary natural character of the family. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
350. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 453, disp. 18, § 5, no.
7; Suirez, De Fide III, supra note 30, at 208, disp. 6, question 3.

1991-1992]

SUAREZ AND THE INDIANS

947

great caution.3 5 1 Thus, conditions had to be taken into ac-

count here. For example, he thought, the number of the faithful involved would have to be large, or, if it were small, they
should be unable to change residence. Again, the hope of sucwanting to get rid of the
cess should be morally certain, "lest
352
cockle, they root out the wheat.

As to the need for some injury inflicted by a nonbelieving
prince, Sufirez agreed with Thomas Aquinas that even before
an actual injury there was in the Church power to remove
princes of this kind on account of "the moral danger" to the
faithful. This, he said, was the position he took in Book III,
chapter 30, number 6 of the Defensio fidei.3 5 I suggest that,
although this position does not contradict Sua'rez's stand
above against "anticipated security," to a casual observer the
two together might be paradoxical.
A final question here is: In whom does this indirect power
reside? It is, Suirez said, evident that such power must be
public and not private. His reasoning seems plain enough.
We are talking about a power to wage war, which always requires a proper public authority. Ultimately, Sufirez said, this
power resided in either the Pope or any supreme Catholic
king. It would be in the Pope "by virtue of his supreme spiritual jurisdiction in order to secure and defend the salvation of
souls. '3 54 In a temporal king, who does not have such jurisdiction, it would exist only for the defense of his "neighbors,"
351. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 454, disp. 18, § 5, no.
8 ("hic modus difficilior est; et ideo, quamvis ad ilium non desit potestas, nihilominus
ad executionem ejus magna circumspectio necessaria est") [781].
352. Id.; see also MATrHEW 13:29.
353. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 349, Ill, ch.
30, no. 6; see also SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 454, disp. 18,
§ 5, no. 8; Suirez, De Fide III, supra note 30, at 208-09, disp. 6, question 3. Note that
in the Defensiofidei passage Suirez also said that the indirect power involved here is
not immediately over an unbelieving prince but over their Christian subjects and in
defense of their rights: "At vero circa principes ethnicos non est per modumjurisdictionis in ipsos principes, sed in eorum subditos christianos, propter quos tuendos
potest infideles arcere, vel in officio continere, et ideo quidquid circa illos operatur,
est per modum defensionis fidelium, non per modum vindictae, aut punitionis infideHum." SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 349, III, ch. 30, no.
6.
354. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 454, disp. 18, § 5, no.
9 ("In Pontifice est ex vi jurisdictionis supremae spiritualis ad procurandam et
defendendam salutem animarum; . . .").
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especially Christians.3 5 5 Hence, a temporal sovereign could
not exercise this power by his own authority unless the unbelieving king brought force against his Christian subjects. The
Pope, however, or a king who is acting as his instrument, very
well could move before an injury because his power ofjurisdiction would extend to prevent evils, lest they occur.3 5 6
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, with one exception, Suarez did not mention the American Indians and the Spanish conquest of the
New World. Although his doctrine regarding the evangelization of non-apostate unbelievers is consistent overall with that
of Vitoria, it is noteworthy that he nowhere asked Vitoria's
principal question about the legitimacy of Spanish claims to
rule the lands and peoples of America.3 57 The natural inference from this is that, both in 1583 and then later in 1614,
Sufirez had no pressing problem about the morality of the conquest and the continued occupation of American territories.
He apparently accepted the "facts on the ground" and contented himself with a largely speculative inquiry about the right
and the limits of preaching the Gospel.
It does seem obvious that the question in its historical setting was applicable to the American Indians and their conquest. It was further relevant to the then-current case of the
Philippine Islands, to which the absence of any reference by
Sufirez is also remarkable.3 58 Again, after the 1581 merger of
Spain and Portugal, the question related to Africa, India, and
355. Id. ("in rege vero temporali, solum est per modum defensionis proximorum, praesertim fidelium,.. ").
356. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 454-55, disp. 18, § 5,
no. 9.

357. See, e.g., 2 RELECTiO DE INDIS RECENTER INVENTIS PRIOR 667 (Te6filo Urdfinoz ed.) ("Supposito ergo quod [isti barbari] erant veri domini, superest videre quo
titulo potuerint hispani venire in possessionem illorum vel illius regionis. Et primo
referam titulos qui possint praetendi, sed non idonei nec legitimi. Secundo, ponam
alios titulos legitimos quibus potuerint barbari venire in ditionem hispanorum.").
358. This seems even more so inasmuch as Suirez's younger brother, Gaspar de
Toledo, also a Jesuit, died in 1581 on a missionary voyage from Acapulco to Manila.
De Scorraille's comment on his passing is quite relevant to our present concern:
"Quand on voulut rassembler ce qu'il laissait, on ne trouva qu'un livre, le Contemptus
mundi, son chapelet et ses instruments de penitence. II avait appris de Xavier et de
ses imitateurs que, pour les conqu~tes qu'il ambitionnait ces armes suffisaient."
SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 181.
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the Far East, including Indonesia, Southeast Asia, China and
Japan. 5 9 At the same time, the Spanish experience in
America, whether in 1583 or in 1614, would have been the
longest and the most prominent for a Spanish Jesuit, even for
one transplanted to Coimbra. It is that experience which
springs to mind wherever there is talk of naked barbarians,
human sacrifice, cannibalism, the right of intervention in defense of innocents, or the experience of gains in number and
devotion of Christian descendents.
As for the internal developments we have witnessed in
Sua'rez between 1583 and 1614, the impression they leave us
with is that over time his views changed in ways both positive
and negative. The absence of any mention of the American
Indians after 1583 seems negative. Even though what he wrote
in 1614 clearly applied to them, today most would like it better
if he had been more specific. In this connection, his retreat
3 60
from the specificity of the De Caritate
was disappointing.
Again, his shift on the "Roman example" seems to us a negative. Logically and historically it is understandable. But for a
modern lover of Sua'rez, as I confess I am, to defend it and its
implications for people in the conquered regions of the New
World is not easy. In contrast, the development of his position
on "anticipated security" seems positive and easy to praise.
When compared with the opposite view that he rejected, it was
a step, however modest, toward a more peaceful and just international order.
Other thoughts concern the clear difference between
Suirez and Vitoria on the issue of the authority to make war.
To me Vitoria's position appears to be in fact supernational. I
have no wish to overstate the case, but on this one particular, I
think Vitoria is closer to that outlook so much associated with
medieval Christendom, which especially after the work of Arquilli~re has been often called "Augustinian. "61 Contrariwise,
Suirz's position here appears more international. He recognized the reality of many nations, non-Christian as well as
359. For an initial consideration of what is involved here, I would recommend
the article by Henri Bernard, discussed supra notes 27 and 257 and accompanying
text.
360. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
361. See H.-X.
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TION DES TH9ORIES POLITIQUES DU MOYEN-AGE

(2d ed. 1955).
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Christian, each "supreme in its own order." Consequently, he
also recognized that there is no supernational temporal power
beyond that which has been explicitly or tacitly agreed to by
those many nations according to thejus gentium inter se. When
authority is then needed to justify the use of force among such
nations, it would be found in each one of them itself. Specifically, it would be based upon each one's right to seek satisfaction from those who have injured it in some serious way. In the
present matter of preaching the Gospel, while the Church is
not a temporal state, it is, as we have noted, 36 2 a "spiritual republic," which in the temporal order can be injured and which
indirectly can seek satisfaction under the jus gentium inter se.
The universal and transcendent character of the Church provides a basis for the particular right of sending and defending
preachers; but this last is to be done, it seems, primarily according to the provisions of thejus gentium inter se.
It is easy to be cynical about Suairez's concern for preaching the Gospel. Surely to many it will seem little more than a
cloak for European expansionism. I would not deny all traces
of that. But simply to reduce Suirez to some kind of imperialistic dupe or pawn would be most unfair. It would also be untrue. One need not read many pages of Sufirez in order to
realize how unlikely he was to be duped. And as for his being a
willing pawn or a duplicitous tool, if we quite reasonably take
account of the faith of a man like Suirez, as well as his overriding conviction about the importance and the necessity of belief
in the Christian Gospel, 363 even when we disagree with him we
should be able to understand his position and to respect it as
well-intentioned.
But more than this, there is an obvious, enduring, positive, and universally admirable side to what he has written.
There is no denying that Suirez, along with Vitoria and other
Spaniards of the time, was conscientiously concerned for both
the rule of law and the welfare of the newly encountered peoples. Coupled with that, he clearly accepted the dignity and
the natural equality of all human beings. In this, he also accepted and affirmed a properly spiritual dimension in every
human life and community. Human beings and their political
362. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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institutions are something more than material objects to be
coveted and seized. Even barbarians, along with their political
choices, are to be respected as equals, at the levels of nature
and thejus gentium, to the persons and choices of Spaniards or
other Europeans.
Not separate from this, though Suirez embraced the medieval thought of subjection, albeit indirect, of the temporal
power of Christian sovereigns to the spiritual power of the
Pope, he recognized the reality of nations not subject to the
Pope, of nations which had not done injury to Christians.
While a present-day critic may not be too impressed by a new
injury of not receiving preachers, most likely that critic would
expect nations today to be open to receive peaceful legates, to
accord them a hearing, and not to mistreat them. From
Suirez's viewpoint an expectation of that kind would be the
simple corollary of people's natural freedom and their right to
choose their own polity. That is to say, the very fact of freedom implies an obligation for both individuals and states to
exercise it in a responsible and moral manner.
Two final points should be added on this. First, as we
have seen aboves 6 law for Sufrez provides the rule of conscience and morality. In the present case, the weight of this
may be well gauged from the role assigned to both the natural
law and the jus gentium. And second, while one might be
tempted to say that turnabout is fair play, in this instance
Sufirez would not agree. While he did accept the natural
equality of all peoples and states, he was absolutely convinced
that Christianity alone is the true religion. For that reason, his
whole argument proceeded from a Christian perpective. From
that perspective, it was objectively right for Christians to send
and defend missionaries to pagans, but not vice versa. 65
While twentieth century critics might be more impartial here
than sixteenth century Suirez, the inner logic of his position
should be apparent even to those who reject it.
364. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
365. SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 748, disp. 13, § 5,
no. 7 ("Ratio est, quia impedire legem Christi est revera gravis injuria, et damnum:
prohibere vero aliam legem, nulla est ... atque hoc modo certum est non spectare
hoc jus ad infideles.") [826-27].

